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I. INTRODUCTION
“I think Governor Taft must be trying to privatize Ohio’s schools.”1
Public education in the State of Ohio is in turmoil. Many public school
administrators began the 2004-2005 school year with fewer teachers, less funding,
and more students than the previous year.2 A record number of local public school
districts submitted tax levies to the voters this past year in an effort to raise essential
funds locally, and a record number of these levies failed.3 Meanwhile, Ohio
1
Statement by the principal of a Cleveland Public Elementary School in a middle-class
neighborhood after explaining that she would begin the 2004-2005 school year with fewer
teachers, less funding, and more students. Interview with anonymous Principal, Cleveland
Public Schools, (April, 2004).
2

Patrick O’Donnell, School Budgets on Chopping Block Statewide; Area Districts Aren’t
Alone in Making Cuts, THE PLAIN DEALER, May 2, 2004, at B1 (noting that the 2.1% increase
in state funding for the 2004/2005 school year is outpaced by inflation and the rising cost of
health care); Desperate Districts; Look at the Aug. 3 Ballot and Discover Further Evidence of
the Statehouse Failure to Overhaul School Funding, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, July 20, 2004,
at 3 (noting that as many as 4,000 teachers were eliminated statewide).
3
Michael Scott, Reeling School Districts Start Cutting, THE P LAIN DEALER, Feb. 10, 2005,
at B1 (chronicling the recent February, 2005 school levy failures); Katie Byard, Akron, Ohio,
Area’s School-Tax Pass Rate is Average, Study Says, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 2004;
Katie Byard, Akron, Ohio-area Schools Hope Presidential Election Brings Votes for Funding,
AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 2004 (stating that “on the Nov. 2 ballot in Ohio [v]oters
will decide slightly more than 300 issues [related to school tax requests]”); Katie Byard,
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historically provides private schools with more state aid than any other state4 and
continues to spend state money supporting privatization experiments, such as
vouchers and charter schools managed or owned by private entities.5 Finally, despite
Ohio Supreme Court rulings in the DeRolph case declaring the General Assembly’s
system of providing for public schools unconstitutional, and unequivocally requiring
the General Assembly to overhaul the system,6 the General Assembly has not
complied with the spirit of the Court’s ruling. Like the entire issue of school
funding, the reasons for the General Assembly’s inaction are incredibly complex and
interwoven.
This Note argues that Ohio has become a political science experiment in
educational privatization and that “Community Schools” have become the
laboratories. That is, one of the main reasons that the State of Ohio under-funds
public education is that the state's guiding educational policy is privatization. The
Ohio courts can address this issue by recognizing that the Ohio Constitution's

Wayne County, Ohio, Teachers, Administrators Won’t Take Raises Amid Budget Woes,
AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, July 22, 2004 ( “Statewide, there will be 103 school tax issues on
the Aug. 3 ballot – the highest ever since August elections were initiated in 1984. . . . ‘This
levy is not going to make us flush,’ said Superintendent Steve Caples. ‘The levy [will] allow
only a bare-bones budget’ . . . .”).
4
GERALD W. BRACEY, THE WAR AGAINST AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS: PRIVATIZING
SCHOOLS, COMMERCIALIZING EDUCATION 98 (2002) (quoting from Dennis J. Willard and Doug
Oplinger, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, Akron Beacon Journal, Dec. 12, 1999, at A1).
5
See Douglas Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Legislature Oks Two-Year Budget--$51.2
Billion Plan Continues Pattern of Curbing Aid for Public Schools, Backing Charters,
Vouchers, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Jun. 22, 2005, at A1; Sandy Theis, Taft Plans to Expand
Vouchers, THE PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 10, 2005, at A1 ( “Private schools would benefit; public
education gets little boost.”); Thomas Suddes, Catholic Vote Could Matter in November, THE
PLAIN DEALER, May 12, 2004, at B9 (“[I]t’s likely that no state spends proportionately more
than Ohio . . . to help parents afford non-public (i.e., often Catholic) schools.”); Scott
Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming With Cyber Schools, THE PLAIN DEALER, June 27, 2004, at
A1 ( “Ohio is leading the nation in cyber-schools, and not just by a little. It’s a virtual rout.”);
Scott Stephens, Schools Out $376 Million to Charters; Cuyahoga Will Transfer $71 Million,
THE PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 17, 2004, at B1. Ohio spent approximately 424 million dollars on
charter schools during the 2004-2005 school year, an increase of 122 million over the previous
year. Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Budget Clauses Benefit Charters – Ohio House Bill
Meant to Cap Growth Restricts Public Districts, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Apr. 23, 2005, at
A1. Of that 424 million, one private, for-profit Educational Management Corporation
(“EMO”), White Hat Management, received 107 million, or about 25 percent of the total. Id.
6
DeRolph v. State of Ohio, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) [hereinafter DeRolph IV];
DeRolph v. State of Ohio, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001) [hereinafter DeRolph III]; DeRolph
v. State of Ohio, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) [hereinafter DeRolph II]; DeRolph v. State of
Ohio, 677 N.E. 2d 733 (Ohio 1997) [hereinafter DeRolph I]. DeRolph I was initially filed in
1991. In addition, the final decision related to the case was The State ex rel. State of Ohio v.
Lewis, 789 N.E.2d 195 (Ohio 2003), in which the Court issued a writ of prohibition to the trial
judge of the case, finally and unambiguously relinquishing jurisdiction over the case. This
decision is sometimes referred to as DeRolph V. Thus, the litigation spanned at least a decade
and included four successive admonitions from the Court to the General Assembly to execute
their constitutional mandate regarding public education.
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approach to public education is inconsistent with privatization. The Ohio
Constitution is inconsistent with privatization because the Constitution views
education as a public benefit and requires that the state assure that every child
receives an adequate education, while privatization views education as a private
benefit and sees the state as responsible for giving every family the opportunity to
pursue a free education. Charter schools, and the arguments raised by their
opponents, exemplify this conflict.7 Therefore, the Ohio courts should invalidate the
privatization aspects of charter school laws in order to redirect the educational policy
of the state toward the constitutional conception of public schooling. An opportunity
to do so is currently before the Ohio Supreme Court in the form of a constitutional
challenge to Ohio’s “community schools.” (“Community school” is Ohio’s name for
the type of schools generally known as charter schools.8 This Note will use the terms
“charter schools” and “community schools” interchangeably.)
The narrow purpose of this Note is to evaluate the constitutionality of charter
schools under the Ohio Constitution. Charter schools (i.e., Ohio community schools)
are nominally public schools that are funded by the state, but independently operated
and governed.9 Privatization generally and charter schools specifically are hotly
contested topics with both strong and baldly self-serving arguments on all sides.10
Therefore, instead of addressing privatization head-on, this Note attempts to discuss
privatization in the limited context of the current constitutional claims against Ohio
community schools.11 This Note argues that several modes of privatization that are
embedded in the Ohio community school laws are fundamentally inconsistent with
the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, the legal challenges to community schools should
be decided in favor of the plaintiffs, and the Ohio General Assembly should be
required to eliminate community schools or, better still, significantly revise their
governing statutes.
7

State of Ohio ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents and Teachers v. State of Ohio Bd. of Educ.,
No. 03AP-508, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009 (10th Ohio Ct. App. 2004). The plaintiff’s Third
Amended Complaint at the trial court level sets forth the claims against charter schools in
detail. See Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, Ohio Cong. of Parents and Teachers v. State
of Ohio Bd. of Educ., Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, available at
http://cpeinfo.ohea.org/ Archives/Amended%20Complaint%20March%202002.htm (last
visited Aug. 31, 2005). For more information on this case at the trial court level, see Judge
McGrath’s trial court opinion. Ohio State Federation of Teachers v. State of Ohio Bd. of
Educ. (2003) No. 01-CVH-05-4457, Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, available at
http://ds.columbuslawlib.org:8080/docushare/dsweb/GetRendition/ Document-2247/html (last
visited Aug. 31, 2005).
8

State ex rel. Ohio Cong. of Parents and Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 105 Ohio St. 3d
1437 (2005) (granting certiori); see also Justices to Mull Suit Opposing Charter Schools, THE
TOLEDO BLADE, Feb. 17, 2005, at A6.
9

Id. at 2. Ohio community school—i.e., charter school—laws are set forth in chapter 3314
of the Ohio Revised Code. OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 3314 (LexisNexis 2004).
10

Henry M. Levin, Studying Privatization in Education in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION: CAN
MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 4 (Henry
M. Levin ed., 2001); Kevin B. Smith, The Ideology of Education: The Commonwealth, the
Market, and America’s Schools 2 (2003).

THE

11

State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009.
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Because “school choice”12 is currently a potent political issue, such a judicial
ruling could help to maintain or augment political pressure on the Ohio General
Assembly to enact a system of public education that is consistent with the Common
School ideology of a single, state-funded system of universal education that is at the
heart of the Ohio Constitution’s education clause.13 Charter schools could be an
aspect of the constitutional system, although not in their present form.
Part II of this Note briefly discusses the current state of public education in Ohio
and outlines the DeRolph litigation and its implications. Part III focuses on the
“thorough and efficient” education clause14 in the Ohio Constitution and analyzes its
meaning from an historical perspective. Part IV addresses the theory behind the
privatization of education in general, briefly discusses the history of privatization,
and introduces different types of educational privatization in Ohio. Part V compares
the ideology behind the education clause in the Ohio Constitution with privatization
ideology and concludes that the two ideologies are in conflict. Part VI discusses
Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State of Ohio Board of Education,15 a
pending Ohio case challenging the constitutionality of community schools, and
evaluates the plaintiffs’ claims within the context of the privatization aspects of
Ohio’s community school laws. After predicting that the Ohio Supreme Court will
uphold Ohio’s community school laws, the section proposes general revisions to the
Ohio charter school laws to bring them within the confines of the Ohio Constitution.
Finally, the Note suggests that an outcome in the case that is consistent with the Ohio
Constitution could act as a catalyst for a political shift in the guiding educational
policy of the General Assembly away from community school legislation grounded
in privatization ideology and toward a constitutional community school.
II. PUBLIC EDUCATION IN OHIO AFTER DEROLPH IV
A. DeRolph v. State of Ohio
The DeRolph case is important to any discussion of public education in Ohio
because it broadly defines the current legal and political landscape surrounding the
issue. In the most recent decision in the ongoing litigation, the Ohio Supreme Court
held in 2002 that the current system of providing public education to Ohio’s children

12
“‘School Choice’ is an umbrella term that is used to discuss various reform proposals
including tuition vouchers, charter schools, and magnet school programs.” Molly O’Brien &
Amanda Woodrum, The Constitutional Common School, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 581, 583 n9
(2004).
13
OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. VI, § 2. This clause of the Ohio Constitution, known as the
“thorough and efficient” clause, provides as follows:
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with
the income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a thorough and efficient
system of common schools throughout the State; but no religious or other sect, or
sects, shall ever have any exclusive right to, or control of, any part of the school funds
of this state.
Id.
14

Id.

15

State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009.
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violates the “thorough and efficient” clause of the Ohio Constitution.16 That clause
states, in pertinent part, that: “The general assembly shall make such provisions, by
taxation or otherwise, as . . . will secure a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the state . . . .”17 However, after finding a constitutional violation
the Court refused to retain jurisdiction over the remedy, leaving it to the Ohio
General Assembly alone to create a “thorough and efficient” system in compliance
with the Constitution.18 Much has been written about school funding and the
intricacies of the DeRolph case declaring the system unconstitutional.19 Therefore, a
brief summary of the case history should suffice here.
In 1991, an alliance of 27520 mostly poor and rural school districts calling
themselves “the Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding”
brought suit against the State of Ohio.21 The Coalition claimed that the system of
funding education was completely inadequate and violated the Ohio Constitution.
After a victory for the Coalition in the Perry County Common Pleas Court in front of
Judge Linton Lewis Jr. the State appealed all the way to the Ohio Supreme Court,
which affirmed Judge Lewis’s finding of unconstitutionality.22
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Francis Sweeney’s 1997 majority opinion in
DeRolph I adeptly summarized the problems with Ohio’s public schools and the
method of funding them.23 Contrary to the national trend, Ohio public schools were

16

DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 530.

17

Ohio Const. of 1851, art. VI, § 2.

18

Lewis, 789 N.E.2d at 203.

19

For an early survey of national school funding litigation, see Molly McUsic, The Use of
Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 310
(1991). Numerous articles have also been written about school funding in Ohio and the
DeRolph litigation specifically. See, e.g., Michael L. Stokes, Judicial Restraint and the
Presumption of Constitutionality, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 347 (2003); Josh Kagan, Note, A Civics
Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 2241 (2003); Thomas B.R. Christenson, II, State School Funding: DeRolph v. State, 97
Ohio St. 3d 434, 2002 Ohio 6750, 780 N.E.2d 529, Decided December 11, 2002, 29 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 839 (2003); Ronald M. McMillan, Please Senator, I Want Some More: The
General Assembly Gets an “F” from the DeRolph Court, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV.773 (1997);
James C. Joslin, Note, Developing a School Funding Remedy Framework for Ohio and
Beyond, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1247 (1995); Morris L. Hawk, Comment, “As Perfect As Can Be
Devised”: DeRolph v. State of Ohio and the Right to Education in Ohio, 45 CASE W. RES.
679 (1995).
20
Two-hundred and seventy-five school districts represented almost half of the total (612)
public school districts in Ohio. The Coalition eventually grew to over 500 districts. Interview
with Jayne Geneva, Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy of School Funding, in Cleveland,
Ohio (Feb. 7, 2005) (on file with author).
21
DeRolph v. State of Ohio, No. 22043, (Perry County, July 1, 1994); Scott Stephens,
School Funding: Textbook Failure; Court Edicts, Genuine Efforts Haven’t Solved Ohio’s
Problem, THE PLAIN DEALER, October 17, 2004, at A1.
22

DeRolph I, 677 N.E.2d 733.

23

Id.
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primarily dependant on local property taxes, not state funds, for revenue.24
Furthermore, the amount of money given to each district by the state was based on
the amount of money in the state budget at the time, not the cost of educating a child
or maintaining a school.25 As a result of this deeply flawed funding structure, as of
1996 ninety-five percent of Ohio school buildings needed repairs, only seventeen
percent of schools’ heating systems were adequate, districts lacked sufficient funds
to comply with the state mandated teacher to student ratio, and Ohio ranked last
among the states in number of computers per student.26 As Justice Sweeney
observed, education “ranks miserably low in the state’s priorities,” despite “the
historical notion that the education of our youth is of utmost concern and that Ohio
children should be educated adequately so that they are able to participate fully in
society.”27
Although the legislature addressed some of the Court’s concerns and enacted
some legislation designed to narrow the funding gap between wealthy and poor
school districts, the same basic issues and positions remained throughout the
subsequent DeRolph cases in 2000, 2001, and 2002.28 Chief among the General
Assembly’s failures was the failure to allocate a per-pupil amount deemed sufficient
to provide a constitutionally adequate education.29
As Justice Resnick stated in her DeRolph IV concurring opinion, “[i]t becomes
obvious that the only practical solution to the dilemma posed by this case lies with
the citizens of Ohio.”30 Nonetheless, there may still be a limited role for the Court to
24

Id. at 738.

25

Id. The amount of state aid “is determined as a result of working backwards through
the state aid formula after the legislature determines the total dollars to be allocated to
primary and secondary education in each biennial budget. Thus, the foundation level
reflects political and budgetary considerations at least as much as it reflects a
judgment as to how much money should be spent . . . .”

Id.
26

Id. at 742-744.

27

Id. at 745.

28
See DeRolph II, 728 N.E.2d at 1020 (“[T]he mandate of the Constitution has not yet
been fulfilled. . . . The most glaring weakness in the state’s attempts to put in place a thorough
and efficient system of education is the failure to specifically address the overreliance on local
property taxes.”); DeRolph III, 754 N.E.2d at 1184 (holding that the Court would not continue
to exercise jurisdiction partially because the legislature had made improvements but mostly
because “no one is served by continued uncertainty and fractious debate.”); DeRolph IV, 780
N.E.2d at 530 (vacating the decision in DeRolph III and holding that “DeRolph I and II are the
law of the case, and the current school funding system is unconstitutional”). Justice Resnick’s
characterization of Justice Moyer’s concurring opinion is also instructive. Id. at 532. “[T]he
Chief Justice ignores the deficiencies in the legislative response thus far and . . . seems to
believe that a battle half-fought is equivalent to a resounding victory as long as this court is no
longer involved in this case.” Id.
29

Debbie Phillips, Executive Director, Ohio Fair Schools Campaign, Address at the City
Club of Cleveland Panel Discussion: Fixing Ohio School Finance: The Governor’s Blue
Ribbon Task Force on Financing Student Success (Jan. 10, 2005).
30

DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 534. Justice Resnick goes on to propose that the voters pass
a constitutional amendment requiring an adequate amount be spent on public education. Id.
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play in this drama.31 By taking a strong stance on politically sensitive issues such as
privatization legislation, the Court might be able to activate the solution that Justice
Resnick identified – the political process.
B. The State of Education in Ohio
Meanwhile, the Ohio economy has taken a steady turn for the worse, and state
funds in general are scarce.32 State aid to education increased by 3.2 percent in 2003,
followed by 2.4 percent in 2004, and 2.1 percent for 2005.33 However, given that the
national inflation rate is approximately two percent and health care costs are
increasing at a rate of approximately four percent, this “increase” is actually a
decrease in terms of percentage of district need.34
The economic downturn in the state also affects citizens’ willingness to vote for
local school tax levies. Because local property tax revenue is still fundamental to the
state system of providing for public education (in spite of the DeRolph Court’s
mantra), record numbers of school districts put school levies on the ballots in the fall
of 2004.35 However, only forty-five percent of school issues on the November 2004
ballot passed statewide, representing the lowest annual success rate in a decade.36
Many districts will have to continue to cut staff and programs simply to meet
operating expenses, and some teachers in districts across the state have agreed to
forego standard pay raises.37 It is important to emphasize that these school levies, for
the most part, are necessary to meet basic needs and not to add additional programs
or build posh administrative offices.38 Therefore when a levy does not pass, any
discretionary expenses, such as extracurricular activities, must be cut in order to
meet basic operating expenses.39 Once those programs are cut they fall out of the
31
Id. at 533. Justice Resnick’s concurring opinion states that:
The Chief Justice [in his dissenting opinion] bemoans the fact that further litigation
may be inevitable in light of the decision today, calling that possibility an ‘unfortunate
eventuality.’ However, what the Chief Justice’s imperceptive view ignores is that as
long as the General Assembly does not definitively fix the school-funding problem,
which is its task alone, or at least make a realistic effort to do so, further litigation will
be inevitable as a matter of course, since the court is the only body that definitively
determines the constitutionality of laws.
Id. (citations omitted).
32

Ohio Heading in Wrong Direction; Work Force Must be Educated for Jobs in New
Economy, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 2, 2005, at B7 (quoting excerpts from a speech by U.S.
Senator Mike DeWine, in which he asserts that “[s]ince 2000, Ohio has lost more jobs than
any other state – a quarter million or 37 percent of all jobs lost nationwide”).
33

O’Donnell, supra note 2.

34

Id.

35

Byard, Ohio-area Schools Hope Presidential Election Brings Votes for Funding, supra
note 3.
36

Byard, Akron, Ohio, Area’s School-Tax Pass Rate is Average, supra note 3.

37

Byard, Wayne County, Ohio, Teachers, Administrators Won’t Take Raises Amid Budget
Woes Teachers Wont Take Raises, supra note 3.
38

Id.; Geneva, supra note 20.

39

Geneva, supra note 20.
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general budget and it becomes increasingly difficult and costly for the school to reinstitute them.40 In this way a school district’s resources are whittled away levy by
levy, until the district is incapable of providing anything more than a bread-andwater education.
III. EDUCATION AND THE OHIO CONSTITUTION
Both the text and the history of the Ohio Constitution’s education clause reveal
that, as the Ohio Supreme Court declared in DeRolph, Ohio must do more than
provide a bread-and-water education. The Ohio Constitution requires that “[t]he
general assembly shall . . . secure a thorough and efficient system of common
schools throughout the state . . . .”41 The use of the word “shall” here should not be
overlooked. It clearly indicates that the framers of the Ohio Constitution of 1851
intentionally placed an affirmative duty on the Ohio General Assembly to provide for
public schools. As the following discussion will demonstrate, the framers
understood the term “common schools” to have a well-defined and particular
meaning: i.e., free, universal, public schools dedicated to fostering democratic
citizens for the good of society.42
Recognition of the importance of universal education is part of the nation’s
founders’ ideal of national democracy as well as Ohio’s state legacy. People like
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Noah
Webster, and Benjamin Rush wrote about the crucial role education would play in a
successful republic.43 Each of these men understood that a well-educated citizen has
a fundamental role in a democratic republic and that it was the responsibility of
government to promote enlightened citizenship. Thus, an understanding of
education as a benefit to society at large as opposed to only the individual has always
been part of the American ideology.44 Ohio history clearly illustrates the strength
and prevalence of this notion of democracy and education, further demonstrating its
importance as a first principle in discussing contemporary school reform
movements.45
This section briefly addresses early national conceptions of universal education
and the subsequent Common School movement in order to put the Ohio
Constitution’s particular approach to education in its broader context. It then
discusses education and the history of the Ohio Constitution and analyzes the
meaning of the education clauses in the Constitution of 1851, the basis of our current
Constitution.

40

Id.

41

OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).

42

See generally O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12. The article by O’Brien & Woodrum
is a key reference for the section on the constitutional history of education in Ohio.
43
1 SUSAN C. HASTINGS ET AL., BALDWIN’S OHIO SCHOOL LAW, 1-2 (2003); Carl F.
Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1780-1860 5-9
(1983).
44

KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 5-9.

45

See generally O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12.
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A. Notions of Universal Education in the Early Republic
In his farewell address in 1796, George Washington said, “[p]romote, then, as an
object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In
proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is
essential that public opinion should be enlightened.”46 Recognition of the unique and
central role of the public in republican government led logically and directly to the
promotion of education urged here by Washington.47 On the same grounds, John
Adams argued for government sponsorship of universal education: “The whole
people must take upon themselves the education of the whole people, and must be
willing to bear the expenses of it.”48 Perhaps the “founding father” most famous for
advocating for universal education. is Thomas Jefferson. 49 In his frequently cited
book on the history of American education, Carl Kaestle writes:
In the preamble of his 1779 bill for free schools in Virginia, Thomas
Jefferson laid out the basic logic of state-sponsored schools for republican
citizenship. Citizens must choose leaders wisely, defeat ambition and
corruption in politics, and protect liberty by keeping a vigilant eye on
government. All citizens should have a chance not only to vote but to be
elected. The government needs wise and honest laws, Jefferson argued,
and thus it needs educated and virtuous lawmakers. In a republic, these
men must be chosen ‘without regard to wealth, birth or other accidental
condition.’ Because there are many people who cannot afford a good
education, Jefferson argued, all should share the cost, in order to foster the
best possible representative government.50
Jefferson unequivocally connected citizenship with education, and viewed the state
society as the beneficiary of an educated citizenry. Since education served an
essential (and essentially) civic purpose, Jefferson believed that it was the state’s
responsibility to provide that education.51

46

HASTINGS, supra note 43, at 1.

47

KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 5.

48

HASTINGS, supra note 43, at 2.

49

One could speculate that there are two potential reasons for this – first, his eloquent and
prolific writing influences researchers to turn to him first for the founders’ approach to any
given topic, and second, he proposed a plan for universal public education in Virginia. With
the exception of Benjamin Rush, none of the other founders attempted to materialize universal
education to that extent. KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 6-9 (citing Thomas Jefferson, Bill for the
More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1779)).
50

KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 6 (citations omitted).

51

Molly O’Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and the “Deregulated” Curriculum, 34
AKRON L. REV. 137, 141 (2000).
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B. Common Schools
It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century, however, that the ideal of
universal public education actually came to fruition,52 in the form of the “Common
School.”53 The Common School movement began in Massachusetts and spread
throughout the midwestern states and territories. Its chief proponent was Horace
Mann, Superintendent of Massachusetts Common Schools in 1837, and a national
voice articulating the Common School ideology and advocating for the spread of
Common Schools.54 That is, ‘common’ in the sense of universally available to all
classes of people–recalling Jefferson’s words above, “without regard to wealth, birth
or other accidental condition.”55 The Common School ideology followed Jefferson
and his colleagues’ logic that universal education plays a central role in a republican
society. In a nation of immigrants, pioneers, and entrepreneurs, the Common School
“would bring together diverse groups of classes and people; it would be the engine of
social mobility and economic opportunity; it would produce virtuous citizens for
self-government.”56 In addition, national identity, patriotism, and a set of shared
values—at the time based in Protestantism—would promote the success of the
republic by creating an affinity among citizens.57 Common School proponents
argued that enlightened national and state citizenship could only develop through the
mechanism of Common Schools. Furthermore, the Common School advocates
popularized “the view that education was an economic benefit to the entire
community.”58 They argued that education is a public benefit because republican
society in general is better served by an enlightened electorate.
The Common School movement in Ohio began in 1829.59 The movement began
as a grassroots effort by a teachers’ organization but gained momentum with the
appointment of Samuel Lewis as the first Superintendent of Common Schools in
1837. Lewis adhered to the Common School ideology popularized by Horace Mann
52
Jefferson’s and Rush’s plans for universal public schooling in Virginia and Pennsylvania
respectively did not succeed in the state legislatures of the early republican period. KAESTLE,
supra note 43, at 8-9.
53

See generally, KAESTLE, supra note 43. Kaestle’s book is dedicated to the history of the
Common School movement, including its ideological foundation in the early republic. It is a
detailed and very frequently referenced work. See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 51; Kagan, supra
note 19; MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, EDUCATION, SOCIETY, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PERSISTENT ISSUES (1995).
54

See KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 75; O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 599.

55

O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 599.

56

Id.

57

See KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 75 (discussing in great detail the ideology underpinning
the common school movement in the chapter entitled, “The Ideology of Antebellum CommonSchool Reform”). Kaestle says that the ideology of common schools had three primary
sources: republicanism, Protestantism, and capitalism. Id.
58

VINOVSKIS, supra note 53, at 92.

59

See generally O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12. O’Brien and Woodrum’s article,
The Constitutional Common School, traces the development of common schools in Ohio in
considerable detail. Id.
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in the eastern United States, and traveled the state giving speeches promoting
Common Schools and lobbying state legislators.60 With the assistance of the
teachers’ organization and a commissioned report on education in Europe by
prominent Ohio citizen and Professor Calvin Stowe, the ideology of common
schooling took root in Ohio.61 As a result, the ideology of the Common School was
the prevailing public and political opinion in 1850 at the time of the Ohio
Constitutional Convention, and it became the basis of the education clauses in the
resulting Constitution.62
C. Ohio Education Clause
The Ohio Constitution of 1851, however, was not the first of Ohio’s foundational
documents to reference universal education. Article III of the Northwest Ordinance
stated that “schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.”63 Like
other progressive ideas (e.g., abolitionism64) that found expression in the Northwest
Ordinance before they were manifested in the established state governments or the
fragile federal government, this “encouragement” clause expressed the enlightened
founders’ view of the role of education in a republic. Predictably, it was repeated in
Ohio’s first constitution, the Constitution of 1802.65 In addition, the Bill of Rights of
60

Id.

61

Id. Calvin Stowe was a relative of author Harriet Beecher Stowe. His report,
commissioned by the Ohio General Assembly, supported the common school rationale
advanced by Superintendent Lewis and the national common school movement. Stowe argued
that creating a sense of national identity would bring the diverse population together around a
set of shared ideals. He “asserted that education was also the way to avoid the ‘evils of an
ignorant and unbridled democracy.’” Id. at 601. O’Brien & Woodrum speculate that this
particular view arose out of the election of populist Andrew Jackson as President. Id.
62
Id. at 611. O’Brien & Woodrum state that “by 1849 public sentiment in favor of free
universal public schooling was strong.” Id. They go on to point out that, during the
Constitutional Convention,
debates on the specific wording of the provisions were lively. Notably, however, the
education activists had succeeded in capturing the rhetorical high ground. In every
session, the idea that an education ought to be provided to every child in the state was
assumed. Free common schooling was presented and accepted as a matter of
patriotism, economic urgency, and democratic necessity.
Id. at 612.
63

ORDINANCE OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORY (1787), art. III. “Religion, morality, and
knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and
the means of education shall forever be encouraged.” Id.
64
Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance states that “there shall be neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude in the said territory.” Id. The United States Constitution, crafted the
same year, explicitly protected slavery for a period of years for fear that doing otherwise
would make ratification impossible.
65

OHIO CONST. OF 1802, art. VIII, § 25.
That no law shall be passed to prevent the poor in the several counties and townships
within this state from an equal participation in the schools, academies, colleges and
universities within this state, which are endowed, in whole or in part, from the revenue
arising from donations made by the United States, for the support of schools and
colleges; and the doors of the said schools, academies, and universities, shall be open
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the Ohio Constitution of 1802 guaranteed access to schools supported by the state
fund, regardless of wealth or social class.66
1. The “Thorough and Efficient” Clause
In light of the Common School movement, the Ohio Constitution of 1851 treated
education in unprecedented detail and fundamentally shifted the state’s official
posture toward a state system of public education from encouragement to guarantee.
The debate in the Constitutional Convention produced the “thorough and efficient”
clause that remains the central clause related to public education.
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund, will
secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout the
State; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever have any exclusive
right to, or control of, any part of the school funds of this state.67
Although the delegates to the convention debated various relevant issues such as the
role of religion in public schools, the extent of the curriculum in the “fancy
branches,” the funding system, and the branch of government entrusted with
responsibility for the schools, not once did they question the appropriateness of
universal, tax-supported public education under the Common School model.68
Instead, there were numerous statements and debates centered on the necessity of
prioritizing universal public education and ensuring its viability into the future based
on a fundamental belief that it would benefit the state. For example, Delegate
Samuel Quigley said:
The great and important business of securing a general education, and of
conducting a well regulated system of common schools, requires
perseverance, energy, and vigilance . . . . The language of this section is
expressive of the liberality worthy of a great State, and a great people.
There is no stopping place short of a common school education to all the
children in the State . . . . Intelligence is the foundation-stone upon which
this mighty republic rests–its future depends upon the impulse, the action
of the present generation in the promotion of literature.69
Emphasizing the importance of an education clause that would ensure the
necessity of future generations to make improvements in the public school system,

for the reception of scholars, students and teachers, of every grade, without any
distinction or preference whatever, contrary to the intent for which said donations
were made.
Id. See also O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 593.
66
Id. at 594 (noting that this clause was not interpreted as guaranteeing access to state
funded schools independent of race).
67

OHIO CONST. OF 1851, art. VI, § 2 (emphasis added).

68

O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 693.

69

Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the
Constitution of the State of Ohio, 1850-51 14-15 [hereinafter Debates of 1850-51].

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005

13

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

480

[Vol. 53:467

Delegate Archibold suggested replacing the word “common” with the word “useful”
in that “[h]e wanted to see a system of schools as perfect as could be devised . . . .”70
Delegate J. McCormick made it clear that the requirement of the legislature should
be unequivocal; that encouragement should give way to constitutional command.
Under the old Constitution it is provided that public schools and the cause
of education shall be forever encouraged; and, under this constitutional
provision, we have trusted the General Assembly for forty-eight years;
and we may trust them for forty-eight years longer, without any good
result . . . . Our system of common schools, instead of improving in
legislative hands, has been degenerating; and I think it is time that we
establish and carry out an efficient system of common school
education . . . .71
Finally, the discussion of race and education at the convention debates reveals the
delegates’ commitment to the notion that education is a public benefit. When
Delegate William Sawyer proposed an amendment that free education be provided
only to white children, he was rebuked on both moral and practical grounds. On the
practical side, Delegate Taylor argued in response that it would be unwise to leave
anyone, black or white, under-educated because an under-educated person is a
burden on the state.
I knew that this Convention was not prepared to increase the political
rights of the black man; but I had hoped that all were willing to provide
against his becoming the pest of society, by being deprived of all
opportunities for education. Shall we not secure protection to ourselves
and our children by relieving the colored population of Ohio, from the
absolute necessity of growing up in vice and ignorance?72
There are blatantly racist overtones to the dialogue; however, it illustrates the
Common School ideology of education as an essential component of a republican
society that should, therefore, be provided by the state.
Thus, the famous “thorough and efficient” clause arose out of the Common
School movement to become an enduring part of the Ohio Constitution.73
70

Id. at 698. As summarized by the Convention reporter,
[h]e hoped to see common schools advance, not only to meet such demands as are
now made upon them, but to meet higher and greater requisitions. Then the common
of the future will need to be far above the common of the present. He wanted to see a
system of schools as perfect as could be devised, and to see it improve so as to keep
pace with the most rapid progress of the most rapid element of our social or political
constitution.

Id.
71

Id. at 702.

72

Id. at 11.

73
O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 616 (“[T]he vision of schooling that would be
incorporated into the Constitution was the common school ideal: universal, free, non-sectarian
education for self-government, enlightenment, and economic advancement.”). In addition to
the “thorough and efficient” clause of Article VI, § 2, the Ohio Constitution also addresses
education in Article VI, § 3 and Article XII, § 5. Article VI, § 3 provides for local control of
city school districts through elected school boards. Article XII, § 5 requires the state to
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IV. PRIVATIZATION
Ohio has not been assertive in finding funds to fulfill its affirmative duty to
provide a thorough and efficient Common School education as mandated by the
Ohio Constitution. In fact, Governor Taft’s February 2005 state budget proposal
called for “ship[ping] more money to private schools,” but proposed little assistance
for struggling public schools.74 Many observers and commentators speculate that the
reason for this has to do with a conservative national and state agenda toward the
privatization of government programs.75 Since education is the largest line item in
the state budget it is a prime candidate for privatization efforts.76
With this in mind, the current legal battle over Ohio’s community schools pits
generally conservative advocates of privatization against supporters of traditional
public schools reflecting the Common School ideal.77 Community schools have
become a battlefield in this ideological war because of their particular characteristics:
community schools are “public” schools funded with public dollars but exempt from

disclose the purpose of a state tax in order for that tax to be valid. Although not exclusively an
educational provision, this clause is relevant to the claim that Ohio charter schools are in fact
partially supported by local tax dollars but nominally entirely supported by state funds. See
infra § VI.
74
See Theis, supra note 5 (“While [Governor] Taft’s budget attempts to ship more money
to private schools, he’s calling for only slight increases for public schools, many of which are
in districts that continue to seek tax increases to avoid cuts in personnel and programs.”).
75

Doug Oplinger and Dennis J. Willard, School Battle Eludes Voters, Takes Its Cues from
Coalitions: Powerful Organizations Turn Education into a War of Words, Litigation and
Money, THE AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 15, 1999, at A1. In their series of articles on
privatization in education in Ohio, Oplinger and Willard discuss the various lobbyists and
special interest groups vying for control over educational policy in Ohio. They suggest that,
with the elections of Republican Governors George Voinovich and Bob Taft, the “school
choice” movement associated with privatization has received considerable executive support
and definitely has the upper hand. Id. The privatization movement in Ohio has also been
recognized by the national press. See Sam Dillon, Voters to Decide on Charter Schools, THE
NEW YORK TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at A15 (quoting Western Michigan University researcher
Gary Miron stating that Ohio charter schools “are very much about privatization”). The
privatization agenda is also readily apparent in the current debate over Social Security. The
essence of President Bush’s Social Security plan is privatization, and the administration seems
unabashed in saying so.
76
See Ohio Department of Education, FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis 109
at http://www.lbo.state.oh.us/fiscal/budget/FiscalAnalysis/125GA/EDU.pdf (last visited Aug.
31, 2005) [hereinafter FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis]; see also generally
Julie Huston Vallarelli, Note, State Constitutional Restraints on the Privatization of
Education, 72 B.U. L. REV. 381 (1992).
77

See State of Ohio ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers v. State Of Ohio Bd. of
Educ., No. 03AP-508, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009. See also Charter School Foes Appeal
Court Ruling, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Oct. 13, 2004, at A5; Jennifer Smith Richards,
Charter Schools Focus of 3rd Suit, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 10, 2004, at 1C.
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many state laws and regulations applicable to traditional public schools.78 They are
often owned and/or operated by for-profit entities.79
Based on this, community school opponents argue that community schools
violate the Ohio Constitution by diverting public funds to private beneficiaries, 80
and that, in practice, community schools do not aid in equalizing educational
opportunity for all – the goal of Ohio’s “Constitutional Common School.”81
Many community school proponents respond that there is nothing inherently
wrong with privatization and that it will improve public schooling and equal
opportunity through school choice, economic efficiency, and competition among
local schools.82

78

See State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009,

at *2.
79
Willard & Oplinger, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4. Under the heading
“EMOs Dominate,” the authors note that the original conception of charter schools in
Minnesota did not include for-profit enterprises but instead focused on a blend of innovative
pedagogy and community involvement. However,
[n]ow education management companies [EMOs] dominate the charter school
movement. . . . [Seventy] percent of the charter schools in [Michigan] were run by
EMOs during the 1998-99 school year, up from 50 percent the year before. . . . In
Ohio . . . EMOs control 45 percent of the state and local funds [allocated to charter
schools] and enroll 46% of the students.
Id. The most recent study of Ohio charter schools indicates that influence of EMOs continues
to increase. Alexander Russo, A Tough Nut to Crack in Ohio: Charter Schooling in the
Buckeye State 5 (February, 2005), available at www.ppionline.org/documents/
Ohioreport_0201.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2005). As of 2004, “[s]ixty-six percent of charter
school students in Ohio attend schools run by education management organizations; 25
percent of charter school students [were] enrolled in [cyberschools] . . . .” Id.
80
At the heart of the plaintiffs’ claims is the assertion that aid to community schools
deprives the local school district in which the community school sits of state funds. See State
ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at *22-23. This
claim is hotly contested by the state and by charter school advocates. See, e.g., Terry Ryan,
Setting the Record Straight on Ohio Charter Schools, THE EDUCATION GADFLY, July 7, 2005,
Vol. 5, No. 24, http://www.edexcellence.net/institute/gadfly/issue.cfm?id=199#2375. Crucial
to the inquiry is the fact that state money follows the child from the traditional school district
to the community school, and the claim that the state deducts from the funds it gives to the
district more per community school pupil than it provides per-pupil in state aid. See Charter
School Tiff Not for the Courts, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, June 18, 2004, at A12. Therefore, the
state is essentially shifting local funds to community schools or reducing the state funds perpupil. Furthermore, economies of scale make it difficult for public schools designed to serve a
certain number of students to serve less students at the same cost. See PEARL ROCK KANE &
CHRISTOPHER J. LAURICELLA, ASSESSING THE GROWTH AND POTENTIAL OF CHARTER SCHOOLS
in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION: CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND SOCIAL COHESION? 203, 228 (Henry M. Levin ed., Westview Press 2001) (noting that “it
costs as much to run a class for twenty-one students as it does for twenty-six”).
81

O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 586.

82

See, e.g., BRENNAN, DAVID L., VICTORY FOR KIDS: THE CLEVELAND SCHOOL VOUCHER
CASE (Brown, Cynthia, ed., New Millennium Press 2002).
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Both positions are vulnerable to theoretical and statistical attack.83 The Ohio
Constitution, however, supports the community school opponents’ position: The
Ohio Constitution is fundamentally incompatible with the privatization aspects of
Ohio’s community school laws. Therefore, it is essential to understand privatization
theory, and the ways in which privatization manifests itself in Ohio community
schools.
A. Privatization Theory in Education
The word “privatization” entered the lexicon remarkably recently, perhaps as a
result of the decline of communism.84 Literally, “to privatize” means “to turn over (a
public property, service, etc.) to private interests.”85 Although privatization is now a
powerful and prevailing global movement, in the United States it began overtly with
the Reagan administration’s emphasis on the importance of small government and
decentralization of government services.86 As one of the primary government
programs of the states, education quickly became part of the privatization
discussion.87 According to Henry M. Levin, Director of the nonpartisan National
Center for the Study of Privatization in Education (NCSPE), national educational
policy is currently moving increasingly toward decentralized solutions and market
ideology (i.e., privatization).88 Levin defines privatization in education as “the
establishment of schools operated by non-governmental authorities, whether for
profit or not-for-profit.”89

83

LEVIN, supra note 10, at 4 (stating that there is little constructive discourse on
privatization between adherents and detractors, “[e]ach side tends to elaborate, and often, to
overstate its position and exaggerate the strength of the evidence supporting its stance”). Mr.
Levine’s organization, the National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education
(NCSPE), is specifically designed to be a nonpartisan and neutral research organization. See
NCSPE, available at www.ncspe.org (“The center provides independent, non-partisan
information on and analysis of privatization in education.”).
84
SAMUEL FLAM & WILLIAM KEANE, PUBLIC SCHOOLS, PRIVATE ENTERPRISE 15 (Rowman
& Littlefield Pub. Inc. 1997) (stating that research identified no dictionary entries for the word
prior to 1983).
85

WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1143 (4th ed. 2000).

86

FLAM & KEANE, supra note 84, at 16. In fact, President Reagan commissioned the
President’s Commission on Privatization in 1983 to study and promote privatization of
government services. Id. at 17. See also Barbara Miner, For Profits Target Education, in
EDUCATION, INC.: TURNING LEARNING INTO A BUSINESS 131, 137 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick
Shannon eds., 2002).
87

FLAM & KEANE, supra note 84, at 14.

88
Levin, supra note 10, at 3. See also Henry A. Giroux, Schools for Sale: Public
Education, Corporate Culture, and the Citizen-Consumer in EDUCATION, INC.: TURNING
LEARNING INTO A BUSINESS 101, 106-07 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick Shannon eds., Heinemann
2002); MICHAEL ENGEL, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION: MARKET
IDEOLOGY VS. DEMOCRATIC VALUES 3 (2000).
89

Levin, supra note 10, at 4-5.
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1. The Market Ideology90 Underlying Privatization
The basic rationale behind privatizing education is that the free market can
deliver a higher quality education at a lower cost than the government because of the
inefficiency inherent in government bureaucracy.91 Privatization advocates argue
that public education is a wholly bureaucratic institution; that bureaucracies are slow
to change, and therefore the status quo overwhelms the wishes of parents, students,
or other interested parties who attempt to advocate for educational reform.92
Proponents of privatization view the free market as value-neutral, promoting
efficiency, results-oriented change, and natural responsiveness to primary
stakeholders’ needs. They favor privatization as a market-based alternative to
“government schools.”93 Parents and students, the consumers of education, are best
situated to know what they want from a school, in fact do know what they want and
will choose to optimize the return on their investment; therefore, private companies
competing for students have every incentive to deliver the highest quality education
at the lowest possible price.94 These incentives, argue market adherents, simply do
not exist in the non-competitive, monopolistic government system of public
education. Therefore, it is not surprising that schools are failing; they have no builtin incentive to succeed and have the ball-and-chain of bureaucracy to hold them
back.95
Privatization advocates also argue that the same incentives address educational
consumers’ (i.e. parents’ and students’) moral and social needs without privatization
itself being a value-based system.96 These needs, like academic and vocational
considerations, are simply factored into the rational decision consumers make in the
90

Noted educational historian Carl Kaestle defines “ideology” as follows:
[A] set of apparently compatible propositions about human nature and society that
help an individual interpret complex human problems and take action that the
individual believes is in his or her best interest and the best interest of the society as a
whole. Ideology is the aspect of culture that attempts to justify and defend a set of
social relations and institutions.
KAESTLE, supra note 43, at 76.
91
Numerous commentators, politicians, and social scientists argue that applying market
theory to education will ultimately improve it and therefore justify privatization. The most
often quoted study was conducted by John Chubb and Terry Moe in 1990. JOHN CHUBB &
TERRY MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990). Many other authors on
both sides of the issue discuss and summarize the market ideology. See, e.g., R. David Walk,
Jr., Counterpoint: How Educational Management Companies Serve Charter Schools and
their Students, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 241 (2003) (arguing in favor of privatization); SMITH, supra
note 10, at 5 (arguing against privatization but citing Chubb & Moe’s argument that public
education is bureaucratic, rule-based, and mired in mediocrity because bureaucracy is
inherently inefficient and traditional public schooling concentrates power in the bureaucracy).
92

SMITH, supra note 10, at 5.

93

Id. at 2 (noting that privatization advocates began to refer to traditional public schools as
“government schools,” and that they use it as a pejorative term).
94

Id. at 4 (calling this “public choice theory” and discussing it in some detail).

95

CHUBB & MOE, supra note 91, at 186.

96

SMITH, supra note 10, at 2.
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school choice marketplace. Thus, the market ideology underlying privatization
presents a unified theory for universal education in which each individual parent
and/or student gets the services they need from state funds distributed to private
educators. However, as this Note will discuss below in sections IV-VI, opponents of
privatization, and the Ohio Constitution, take a fundamentally different approach to
education that challenges the coherence of the market ideology underlying
privatization.
2. The Dimensions of Privatization: Economic, Political, and Social
Privatization of education exists on several levels, some more obvious than
others.97 The economic dimensions of privatization are the most apparent.
Transferring responsibility for public education from government agencies to private
entities means shifting control of tax dollars from the public to private sector.98 The
government will maintain a minimal regulatory influence, but market considerations,
as opposed to political considerations, will predominantly govern the use of the
funds.99 Similarly, the political aspects of privatization are not difficult to recognize.
Policy considerations are fundamental to the extent to which states privatize or
maintain control of public education. For example, if market ideology is the
prevailing political philosophy in a state, then deregulation, volunteerism, and other
forms of privatization will be more likely to find political support and occur.100
The social dimensions of privatization are more subtle. For example, when
Coca-Cola contracts with a cash-strapped school district for the exclusive vending
and advertising rights in all district schools, Coke is asserting a private (nonnutritious) influence over district school children.101 “The curriculum therefore
reflects the values of the groups in society who enjoy the power to promote their
interests.”102 The power to influence students’ values in this way may be described
97
Amy Stuart Wells & Janelle Scott, Privatization and Charter School Reform: Economic,
Political, and Social Dimensions in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION: CAN THE MARKETPLACE
DELIVER CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 234, 236 (Henry M. Levin ed.,
2001).
98
This applies to the varying degrees of privatization that might be accomplished by, for
example, contracting out. That is, governments privatize an aspect of education when it
contracts with a private company to provide a specific, limited service, such as transportation.
Educational Management Companies, or “EMOs” are a more complete form of privatization
via contracting in which the government contracts with a private company to manage all
aspects of a school. Id. at 235.
99
See, e.g., Walk, supra note 91, at 243; WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 236
(discussing privatization advocates and their theories); BRUCE FULLER, THE PUBLIC SQUARE,
BIG OR SMALL?: CHARTER SCHOOLS IN POLITICAL CONTEXT in INSIDE CHARTER SCHOOLS: THE
PARADOX OF RADICAL DECENTRALIZATION 18-19 (Bruce Fuller ed. 2000) (summarizing Chubb
& Moe’s position regarding market forces, bureaucracy, and education).
100

WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 236. “Volunteerism” refers to voluntary
organizations providing a service that government agencies traditionally provide. Id. For
example, religious organizations that provide shelter for the homeless engage in volunteerism.
101

ALFIE KOHN, WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE WELL EDUCATED? AND MORE ESSAYS
STANDARDS, GRADING, AND OTHER FOLLIES 15 (2004).

ON

102

O’Brien, supra note 51, at 146.
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as a form of social capital. Different schools’ comparative access to private sources
of social capital is a form of social privatization.103 More specifically, schools’
ability to raise funds from private donors, dependence on those funds, selective
marketing to sort out needy students, or the probability of finding uniquely skilled
local volunteers is privatization to the extent that it allows non-governmental entities
to exercise control over government services. These social dimensions of
privatization should not be ignored because they may significantly affect the
practical likelihood that privatization can deliver on the promise of equal educational
opportunity for all children that is at the heart of the Ohio Constitution.104
B. Basic Types of Educational Privatization
Total adherence to the market theory discussed above would mean that education
would not be public at all and would have to be purchased.105 Therefore, all
mainstream proposals to privatize education include public funds channeled to
private service-providers. There are, however, different types and varying degrees of
privatization that are worth identifying and loosely categorizing.
There are two main categories of privatization in education, which this Note will
refer to as “state non-public aid” and “state sponsorship.” First, state non-public aid
describes when the government maintains control of education but provides private
institutions with funds to reimburse them for taking on a portion of the state’s
responsibility for public schooling.106 State non-public aid includes the transfer of
state funds to non-public schools for the benefit of children in the non-public schools
for certain services and supplies. Examples include busing, supplies such as
textbooks, and administrative assistance.107 Second, state sponsorship occurs when
the government acts to shift some or all of its responsibility to provide a public
education onto a private entity. State sponsorship consists primarily of contracting
out,108 Educational Management Organizations (EMOs),109 vouchers,110 tax credits,111
and, most relevant to this Note, charter schools.112
103

WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 98, at 236.

104

Id.

105

SMITH, supra note 10, at 6.

106

A historical note illustrates the sea change in the relationship between public and
private schooling during this century. In the first half of the century, the public school ideal
was so strong that the state of Oregon attempted to require not only that all students attend
school, but that all students attend a public school. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1924). The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated this law, upholding parents’ right to choose to
send their children to non-public schools. Id. However, the case is indicative of the profound
difference between the state practically attempting to eliminate private schools and the state
providing monetary aid to private schools.
107
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (LexisNexis 2004). This section is entitled:
Payments for providing textbooks, services, and educational equipment to students at nonpublic schools. Id.
108

A public school district contracting with a private company to provide some aspect of
the educational program is probably the most common form of privatization. For example, a
small school district might contract with a landscaping company to mow its lawns rather than
establish its own grounds department. Frank R. Kemerer, The Legal Status of Privatization
and Vouchers in Education in PRIVATIZING EDUCATION: CAN THE MARKETPLACE DELIVER
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The distinction between these two types of privatization is most useful as a
descriptive device, but also marks the stages in the expansion of privatization efforts
in education. While state non-public aid has been part of many states’ systems of
public education for decades, state sponsorship, particularly the more extensive
forms such as vouchers, EMOs, and charter schools, is a relatively recent
development that corresponds with the larger movement toward privatizing
government services.
C. History of Educational Privatization in Ohio
In the last decade, Ohio has had the distinction of leading the nation in the first
privatization category: aid to non-public schools.113 This ranking is indicative of
Ohio’s political attention to privatization efforts since the administration of former
Governor and current U.S. Senator George Voinovich.114 In fact, many journalists,
politicians, school administrators, and observers speculate both on and off the record
that there is a concerted political effort to privatize Ohio’s schools.115 Whether or not
the trend is by design, it is a simple fact that Ohio has enacted significant
privatization legislation in the past several decades.

CHOICE, EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, AND SOCIAL COHESION? 39, 40 (Henry M. Levin ed., 2001)
(“School districts routinely contract with private organizations to provide such services as bus
transportation, meals, maintenance, and special education for severely disabled children”).
109

Educational Management Organizations (“EMOs”) are companies that specialize in
contracting to manage all or most of the aspects of a public school. For obvious reasons,
EMOs might be thought of as simply the most extensive version of contracting out. FLAM &
KEANE, supra note 85, at 162.
110

“[A]n instrument used for the transfer of public funds to a person, program, school, or
business that educates students in a setting other than a public school.” Id. at 164. Cleveland,
Ohio (along with Milwaukee, Wisconsin) served as a national testing ground for educational
vouchers. The state provided an educational voucher for urban students to use at a qualified
private school of their choice. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (finding
the Cleveland voucher program constitutional under the U.S. Constitution). See also Theis,
supra note 5 (discussing the current expansion of the Ohio Voucher program proposed by
Governor Taft in his February 2005 “State of the State” address).
111

See KEMERER, supra note 108, at 48-49.

112

See LEVIN, supra note 10, at 4.

113

See Willard & Oplinger, supra note 4.

114
Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Voucher System Falls Far Short of Goals, AKRON
BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 14, 1999, at A1.
115

For example, Oplinger and Willard quote Ohio Senator Ben Espy, who said,
“lawmakers have wondered for years why there was so much pressure from the executive
branch and legislative leaders to fund vouchers and charter schools.” Dennis J. Willard and
Doug Oplinger, State Asked to Investigate Schools, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 17, 1999,
at C1. In addition, Ohio public school funding coalition leaders Jayne Geneva and William
Phillis explicitly state that they believe there is a concerted effort among Ohio politicians to
privatize Ohio’s schools. Geneva, supra note 20; Telephone Interview with William Phillis,
Executive Director, Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy in School Funding (Jan. 11,
2005); see also supra note 1.
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1. State Aid to Non-Public Schools
The first important wave of privatization legislation in Ohio occurred in the
1960s and falls into the first privatization category discussed above–state non-public
aid.116 In the late 1960s the state enacted legislation providing transportation for
non-public school children.117 In 1975, the Ohio General Assembly enacted
legislation approving expenditures for auxiliary services such as audiovisual
equipment and required curricular items such as health textbooks for non-public
schools.118 Additional legislation was enacted in 1982 providing non-public schools
with state funds for administrative costs.119 This amount was then increased by fifty
percent in 1996.120 Including transportation, auxiliary costs, administrative costs,
and other various aid, by 1997 the state was giving over 125 million dollars to nonpublic schools and, since 1974, had given almost 1.6 billion dollars in state aid.121

116
RICHARD E. MAXWELL ET. AL., OHIO SCHOOL FINANCE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 24 (2d
ed. 1996). Ohio was not the first and is far from the only state to provide monetary aid to nonpublic schools. See generally id. at 168-69. The key case setting forth the rationale for
providing state aid to non-public schools is Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education,
281 U.S. 370 (1930). In Cochran, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law providing some state
funding to non-public schools on the theory that the money was not technically benefiting the
school, but actually benefited the children in the school. 281 U.S. 370. Since these children
would have been educated by the state but for their private school enrollment the Court found
it reasonable to allow for state aid for their benefit. This is known as the “child benefit
theory.” MAXWELL, at 169-70. Notably, the Court in Cochran did not mandate such aid, it
merely permitted it. Id. at 169.
117
MAXWELL, supra note 116, at 169 (noting that no line item for this expense has ever
been added to the State budget despite the fact that it is a significant expense borne solely by
the state education budget).
118
Id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.06 (LexisNexis 1975). In 1973 the Ohio General
Assembly passed a similar, but less substantial, auxiliary services act that was struck down by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Wolman v. Essex, 421 U.S. 982 (1975). MAXWELL, supra note 116,
at 24. The 1975 version was more deftly drafted and passed constitutional muster in Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). Id.
119

MAXWELL, supra note 116, at 168-69.

120

MAXWELL, supra note 116, at 22, 168-69 (“Governor Voinovich is urging the expansion
of Ohio’s contribution to non-public schools even though this state currently has one of the
most extensive programs in the nation”). See also Oplinger & Willard, supra note 115,
describing in detail former Governor George Voinovich’s consistent efforts to increase aid to
non-public schools and emphasizing his connections with Catholic bishops and Ohio parochial
schools. For example, Voinovich said: “In many districts in the state, I suspect the non-public
schools will be receiving a much greater increase in terms of state reimbursement than some
public schools.” Id. In addition, the article notes EMO White Hat Management founder
David Brennan’s relationship with Voinovich and quotes from a letter to Catholic Bishop
Anthony Pilla written by Brennan: “You are providing an opportunity for a lot of kids who
wouldn’t ordinarily have a chance to have a good education, and we should really see if we
can’t stimulate more state support for a non-public school system.” Id.
121

MAXWELL, supra note 116, at 24.
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In 1996, then Ohio Governor George Voinovich announced that Ohio was number
one in the nation in providing aid to children in private schools.122
2. State Sponsorship of Privatization
The second wave of privatization relates to state sponsorship and occurred in the
1990s under Governors Voinovich and Taft.
Following the national and
international trend toward privatization, conservative politicians and special interest
groups in Ohio began aggressively advocating for “school choice” reforms of Ohio
public schooling.123 The first of the major state sponsorship efforts in Ohio was the
Cleveland voucher plan, while the second was state charter school legislation.
a. Educational Vouchers
The idea of educational vouchers has a long history in the United States.124
NCSPE director Henry Levin calls educational vouchers a radical development and
defines them as “certificate[s] parents can use to pay all or a portion of tuition at any
school that meets state guidelines for eligibility.”125 Most educational vouchers,
including Cleveland’s, however, provide an amount that is less than the tuition of the
private school, thus requiring parents to provide the remainder of tuition “as a
gesture of sacrifice and shared responsibility.”126
The voucher experiments in Cleveland, Ohio and Milwaukee, Wisconsin in the
1990s were the first major test of the idea’s viability and constitutionality.127 The
voucher experiment in Cleveland grew out of George Voinovich’s effort to reform
Ohio’s schools during his first term as Governor and the recommendations of the
Governor’s Commission on Educational Choice, appointed by Voinovich in 1992.128
At the time, the Commission’s chairman, David Brennan, expressed views definitely
favoring privatization ideology, indicating the connections between the “school
choice” movement and privatization. Brennan refers to public schools as
“government schools,” and, in 1992, said of Ohio’s public schools, “[w]e have a
system that would be the envy of Soviet Russia. Total centralization . . . .”129

122

Oplinger & Willard, supra note 114.

123

See Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75.

124

LEVIN, supra note 10, at 6 (noting Milton Friedman’s voucher plan in 1962).

125

Id. at 3.

126

Id. at 11.

127

Id. at 4.

128

BRENNAN, supra note 82, at 33. The author, David Brennan, was the chairman of the
Commission and is now the owner of White Hat Management, one of the largest EMOs in
Ohio. Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Reading, Writing, Revenue—White Hat Continues
its Rapid Expansion in the For-Profit Education Industry, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Aug. 15,
2005, at A1.
129

Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75. The authors point out that David Brennan has
continued to advocate for “school choice” on a national level. In 1998, he gave a one
thousand dollar campaign contribution to Tom Tancredo of Colorado, a United States
Representative “who pledged to abolish public education.” Id. See also Oplinger & Willard,
supra note 128; Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, David Brennan’s White Hat
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b. Charter Schools; Ohio Community Schools
Charter schools represent the other component of the state sponsorship wave of
educational privatization legislation in Ohio. In 1997, Ohio officially joined what
commentators describe as the fastest growing form of school choice reform in the
nation130 by enacting charter school legislation.131 Although Ohio was not one of the
first states to enter the charter school arena, it has made up for a slow start with
accelerated growth. In fact, Ohio is now leading the nation by a wide margin in a
variety of charter school known as “cyberschools” or “e-schools:” “schools in which
students complete their coursework online using home computers.” 132 As of
September 2004, according to Ohio Department of Education statistics, there were
210 charter schools operating in the state, enrolling over 52,000 students.133 In
addition, out of 44 states with charter school laws, Ohio’s is characterized as the 11th
“strongest” by a leading charter school advocacy group because it leaves charter
schools relatively unconstrained by government regulations.134 That is, Ohio charter

Management Changes the Way Business, Politics, and Educational Vouchers Mix, AKRON
BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 13, 1999, at A1.
130

O’Brien, supra note 52, at 152.

131

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314 (LexisNexis 2004).

132

Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming with Cyber Schools, supra note 5. One half of all of
the cyberschools in the nation are located in Ohio. E-mail from Jayne Geneva, Ohio Coalition
of Equity and Adequacy in School Funding (Feb. 11, 2005, 3:45 EST) (on file with the
author). In 2003-2004, Ohio provided cyberschools with $290 million in state aid. Id. Many
of the cyberschools are operated by for-profit EMOs. Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming with
Cyber Schools0, supra note 5. As of March, 2005, 48 of the 249 charter schools in Ohio were
cyberschools, Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Charter Schools Expansion Expensive,
AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Mar. 20, 2005, at A1, and 15,800 of the 62,000 charter school
students in Ohio are enrolled in cyberschools. Andrew Welsh-Huggins, E-Schools May Get
New Rules, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Mar. 15, 2005, at B5.
133

Russo, supra note 79, at 5 (citing Ohio Department of Education statistics). More
recent Ohio Department of Education data cited in newspaper articles indicates that “[a]bout
63,000 students are enrolled in 249 charter schools this year (2005), receiving about $424
million in state . . . tax dollars this year.” Facts About Charter Schools in Ohio, AKRON
BEACON JOURNAL, Mar. 24, 2005, at A6. “Over the past five years, the number of charter
schools in Ohio has nearly tripled from 68 to 249 while the number of students attending them
has nearly quadrupled from 16,717 to 62,702.” Jim Provance, Ohio Lawmakers Aim to Curb
Growth of Charter Schools, THE TOLEDO BLADE, May 27, 2005, at A1. This rapid expansion
has caused some state legislators to advocate for slower or no charter school expansion
recently. Id. In fact, State Senator Teresa Fedor, D-Toledo, recently initiated an investigation
into the allegedly hasty and reckless approval of new charter schools by the Lucas County
Educational Service Center. See, e.g., Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Charter Schools in
Question—Official Approved at Least 78 Schools in 18 Months, Senator Says, AKRON BEACON
JOURNAL, July 6, 2005, at B1.
134

THE CENTER FOR EDUCATION REFORM, CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS ACROSS THE STATES:
RANKING AND SCORECARD 9 (8th ed. 2004), available at http://www.edreform.com/_
upload/charter_school_laws .pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2005) [hereinafter CER Rankings]. The
“strength” of a state’s charter school law, according to The Center for Education Reform, is
basically inversely proportional to the restrictions placed on charter schools by the state; i.e.,
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schools are not subject to most of the various curricular and noncurricular mandates
made to public schools by the state.135 This deregulation is a classic form of
privatization in that it shifts control of a traditionally public responsibility to a
private provider.
The genesis of charter schools, however, has little to do with privatization.136
One charter school opponent called Ohio community schools “a great idea . . . that
has been hijacked by people whose idea is to privatize public education.”137 Ohio’s
“strong” charter school laws are more apt to allow for-profit companies such as
EMOs to become heavily involved, making charter schools a business. In fact,
EMOs make up almost half of Ohio charter schools and most of the state’s largest
cyberschools are run by EMOs.138 In addition, as discussed later in further detail,
Ohio charter schools also exhibit other more subtle dimensions of privatization such
as market and social isolation from democratic citizenship and community goals.139

the more private in character the better. The more schools allowed, the more chartering
authorities available (particularly other than the local school board), the greater variety of
charter applicants (including for-profit entities, etc.), the more new starts (as opposed to
conversions of traditional public schools), the more restrictions and regulations that can be
waived (compared to the regulations applicable to traditional public schools), and the more
autonomous the schools are (contractually, fiscally, and legally), the stronger the law is.
THOMAS L. GOOD & JENNIFER S. BRADEN, THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE: CHOICE, VOUCHERS,
AND CHARTERS 128 (2000). Ohio has been rising in The Center for Education Reform’s
rankings, probably indicating that the charter school laws in Ohio are getting stronger with
subsequent revisions. In December of 1998, Ohio had fifteen operating charter schools and its
laws were rated twenty-third strongest. The Center for Education Reform, Charter School
Legislation: State Rankings (1998) reprinted in GOOD & BRADEN at 29. Thus, it has risen
twelve slots in six years.
135

CER Rankings, supra note 134; Geneva, supra note 20.

136

Oplinger & Willard, supra note 4.

137

Russo, supra note 79, at 29 (quoting Ohio Federation of Teachers President Tom
Mooney).
138
The for-profit nature of Ohio charter schools is now so prevalent that a recent article in
a major Ohio newspaper defined charter schools as “for-profit schools that private groups
began opening a decade ago with the help of local and state tax dollars.” Stephanie Warsmith
& Katie Byard, Losing Ground: Public School Enrollments Are Sinking in Ohio’s Big Cities
as Residents Opt for Alternatives, Forcing Deep Budget Cuts, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Jan.
23, 2005, at A1. This is simply incorrect, but it indicates the intimate connection between
charter schools and privatization in Ohio. Public perception has shifted from viewing charter
schools as innovative public schools to viewing them as private, market-based alternatives to
traditional public schools. See also Oplinger & Willard, David Brennan’s White Hat
Management Changes the Way Business, Politics and School Vouchers Mix, supra note 129
(noting that Brennan has “turned his attention to charter schools, which may [allow] him to
focus on an important principle: making money”); Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming with
Cyber Schools, supra note 5; Welsh-Huggins, supra note 132 (noting that as of March, 2005,
72 percent of students attending cyberschools attend three privately run cyberschools).
139

See generally WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 234, 237 (noting that the way charter
school laws are written allow for or produce privatization effects).
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Like vouchers, Ohio charter schools are politically and legally contested because
of their privatization aspects. However, unlike the resolved voucher litigation, the
legal challenges to charter schools in Ohio have just begun. A state constitutional
challenge to Ohio’s charter school law, Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers, is the
subject of discussion in section VI below.
V. COMPARISON OF IDEOLOGIES – PRIVATIZATION AND THE OHIO CONSTITUTION
The history of the “Constitutional Common School” in Ohio demonstrates that
the Common School is at the heart of the Ohio Constitution’s conception of a
democratic and universal public education. Not only was the ordinary common or
“public” school the goal, but the framers of the Ohio Constitution of 1851
passionately stated their adherence to that ideology. With this in mind, it seems
useful to compare privatization ideology with the basic theoretical underpinnings of
the Constitution’s understanding of what would constitute a “thorough and efficient
system” of education.
There are two related concepts that are central to the Constitutional Common
School system, and antithetical to the privatization ideology. First, the purpose of
public education is to foster republican citizenship and shared democratic values, and
second, the beneficiary of education under the Constitutional Common School model
is the state.
A. Formal Equality vs. Equal Opportunity
The gravamen of the constitutional argument against privatization can be stated
as follows: Privatization faithfully expects market forces to provide an equal
educational opportunity, whereas the Ohio Constitution requires the state to deliver
on that promise. (Once again, note the framer’s use of the word “shall” in the
education clause within the ideological context of the Common School movement.)
Privatization as a method of satisfying the private benefit purpose of education
(within the context of privatization ideology) relies on the market to deliver equal
opportunity in education.140 In contrast, the goal of providing an equal opportunity to
all classes, races, etc. of children is apparent in the Common School movement and
the convention debates.141 This is a fine, but significant, distinction. The distinction
leads to the conclusion that, instead of affirmatively pursuing equal educational
opportunity for all children, privatization stops at a point closer to “formal equality.”
Formal equality is a concept in constitutional law that “seeks fairness by
preventing governments from using certain traits, notably race and gender, to disable
individuals.”142 It is a relatively easy burden to shoulder because it has only negative
content; it simply prohibits unfair provisions of services as opposed to requiring
provision of services to level the playing field.143 Although somewhat lacking in

140

Smith discusses this concept in terms of “public choice theory.” SMITH, supra note 10,

at 4.
141
Equality of social class was an explicit goal, but racial equality was not an intended
outcome for the framers of Ohio’s constitution. Debates of 1850-51, supra note 69, at 11.
142

James Wilson, Why a Fundamental Right to a Quality Education is Not Enough, 34
AKRON L. REV. 383, 387 (2000).
143

Id.
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substantive content as well, “equal opportunity” recognizes a more affirmative duty
of the state to create the conditions necessary to provide an education that equalizes
opportunities for all classes of Ohio children.144
An analogy can be drawn between the neutrality of the market and the negative
content of formal equality. That is, under a pure market approach (privatization) the
state provides funds but the market ensures their equal distribution. Thus,
privatization proponents argue that the state is relieved of any possibility of
discriminating against any interest yet children still benefit from a system that
provides for their educational needs through market forces acting to provide equal
opportunities for all.145
A leap of faith is required to believe in the market’s capacity to deliver equal
educational opportunity to children. First, market theory depends on the notion that
parents are capable of maximizing educational returns for their children via school
choice. But, as numerous commentators conclude, this is highly unlikely to be the
case.146 More importantly, education is primarily about the child, not the parent. It is
wildly improbable that children, (e.g., kindergarteners) are the rational economic
actors upon which privatization theory depends. Basing the state system of
education on parental choice therefore subjects some children to the bad choices of
their parents in a public context. That is, the state may not interfere with parents’
legitimate privacy interest in the freedom to make a bad (or good) choice to send
their child to a private school,147 but the same choice in the privatization context is
essentially sponsored by the state. Ultimately, a state system that undermines the
public benefits purpose of public schools risks creating a system in which the quality
of a child’s education depends on the quality of their parent’s choices.
Unfortunately, this may be a recipe for perpetuating a hereditary class system.
On the other hand, the Common School ideology is more in line with the notion
of equal opportunity and the tendency toward affirmative rather than negative state
duties. Recognition of social inequalities and the need to use education to avoid
making them part of a child’s inheritance is embedded in the Common School
philosophy and, as a result, the Ohio Constitution. The shift in the Constitutional
language from encouragement to guarantee is indicative of the affirmative nature of

144

Id. at 387-88.

145

Wells & Scott, supra note 97, at 236 (citing M. Carnoy, School Improvement: Is
Privatization the Answer? in Decentralization and School Improvement: Can We Fulfill the
Promise? 163-201 (J. Hannaway and M. Carnoy eds., 1993)).
146

See, e.g., Alfie Kohn, Privatization of Schools in EDUCATION, INC.: TURNING LEARNING
INTO A BUSINESS 102 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick Shannon eds., 2002). Kohn says that
“[p]rivatizing schools is predicated on an almost childlike faith in competition . . . .” Id. He
also notes that shifting to a market basis means shifting resources to marketing schools, not
delivering educational benefits. Id. Benveniste et. al. continue this line of reasoning by noting
that parents are uncertain about education and wary of radical curricula. Therefore, the market
incentive is toward the status quo, not innovation. LUIS BENVENISTE ET. AL., ALL ELSE EQUAL:
ARE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS DIFFERENT? xv (2003). See generally Makani N. Themba,
“Choice” and Other White Lies in EDUCATION, INC.: TURNING LEARNING INTO A BUSINESS
140 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick Shannon eds., 2002) (concluding that school choice is simply not a
reality for many segments of the population).
147

Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
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the state’s responsibility for education.148 Again, relating this to the Ohio framers’
debate regarding educating freemen is instructive. The solution that the framers
chose was rooted more in equal opportunity than formal equality. The “thorough
and efficient” clause in the Ohio Constitution uses the word “shall” to create a
positive state duty to all Ohio children.149 It does not frame the state’s responsibility
as a negative right for certain races or classes to attend public schools.
In addition, the affirmative state duty approach acknowledges that private goals
are not always in line with state goals. 150 For instance, some might argue that
privatized schools can provide the state system of public schools that emphasizes the
importance of democratic citizenship contemplated by the Ohio Constitution.
However, “democratic citizenship” is not likely to be a marketable idea to parents
who look to education for its private benefits and are concerned mostly with ensuring
economic advantage for their children.151 Thus, without active state involvement, it
is unlikely that schools will promote democratic citizenship because there is no
economic incentive to do so. In contrast it is the very absence of a driving market
ideology that makes this a viable goal for public schools.152
B. Private vs. Public Benefits
The way individuals view the goals of education and the way the state views the
goals of education may be significantly different. An individual tends to think
primarily about what an education will do for himself or her family. Society at large,
on the other hand, is likely to have a much broader view that emphasizes the benefits
that education confers on the state. Privatization advocates prioritize individual
goals and believe that the market can best provide for the natural diversity of
individuals’ educational preferences through choice.153 The opposing view, which is
at the heart of the Common School ideology, prioritizes the notion that the benefits
of education accrue to everyone in society, even those people who have no direct
personal stake in schools such as families without children.154 It is clear from the
history of Ohio’s Constitutional Common School that the framers intended to
prioritize the latter view that education is a public benefit.
148

Kagan, supra note 1920, at 2258 (stating that State Constitutions’ ‘adequacy clauses’
“create positive state duties . . . rather than negative rights”).
149
The clause states that: “The general assembly shall . . . secure a thorough and efficient
system of common schools throughout the state . . . .” OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2 (emphasis
added).
150

ENGEL, supra note 88, at 89.

151

Id. In some respects, the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Note, the
private benefits approach may threaten to initiate a “tragedy of the commons” cycle. See
generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (Dec. 13, 1968).
152

Id.

153
LEVIN, supra note 10, at 8 (“[T]he goal of meaningful choice is to address private
benefits.”). Some privatization advocates take a more radical position. Based on the idea that
families and individuals are the beneficiaries of education, they argue that all education should
be financed privately; that the state should not be involved at all. Levin calls this an
uncommon but important view. Id. at 6.
154

Id. at 7.
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This intention is evident in both the principles of the Common School movement
and the content of the convention debates. Central to the Common School ideology
is the belief that shared experiences will inculcate common civic values and promote
the ultimate goal of the Common School system: the furtherance of an egalitarian
democratic republic.155 Therefore, an approach that emphasizes market exploitation
of educational niches created by the private preferences of individual families is
inconsistent with the Common School ideology. In other words, an approach that
replaces the “melting pot” metaphor with the “tossed salad” metaphor conflicts with
the framer’s intent to use schools to create an integrated society.156 Furthermore, the
delegates’ discussion of educating freemen plainly illustrates that they conceived of
public education as a public benefit. In fact, the Ohio Constitution Debates of 185051, quoted supra in section III, C, 1, clearly imply that the framers cared little about
the private benefits that an education would confer on an African American
individual. The argument that carried the day was that freemen should be educated
in order to benefit white society—the contemporary conception of Ohio society.157
Modern commentators note that public schools have traditionally served an
important role in “processing” difficult social and political issues, e.g., racism or the
Vietnam War.158 That is, students in local public schools learn to deal with the
complex social issues of the day because students with diverse backgrounds and
perspectives attend the same school. In contrast, proponents of privatization would
view this social function as a distraction from the academic goal of schools.159 To be
sure, the academic purposes of education have public benefits. However, academics
are only part of the Common School ideology. Therefore, to the extent that the
pursuit of private educational benefits prioritizes academic goals it may short-change
the democratizing function of public schools that is central to the Common School
ideology.160
155

O’Brien, supra note 51, at 144. More polemic commentators such as Henry A. Giroux
take very strong positions on this issue. For example, Giroux says, “democratic culture cannot
survive unless schooling gets treated as a public good rather than a private good.” GIROUX,
supra note 88, at 105.
156

O’Brien, supra note 51, at 169-70. This is a classic metaphor most often used in the
context of multiculturalism. Although the imagery is not as potent, it seems that the most
accurate conception of the idea would be the scientific distinction between a mixture and a
solution.
157

Debates of 1850-51, supra note 69, at 11.

158

For example, Smith notes that democratic conflict being played out in schools is
consistent with their purpose and serves an important democratic role. SMITH, supra note 10,
at 9.
159

Id. at 10.

160

Smith points out that this democratizing function of public schools can be a doubleedged sword. At the same time that shared experiences and participation in an institution
reflecting the social and political values of the community promotes democratic awareness and
responsibility, it also may propagate the “dominant socio-economic hierarchy and embed it in
successive generations.” SMITH, supra note 10, at 12. Smith goes on to suggest, however, that
market reforms might only exacerbate this problem. Id. However, this brings up a larger
issue that is beyond the scope of this note. That is, what, exactly, are the democratic values
referenced here? See FULLER, supra note 99, at 8-10 (discussing the issue under the heading
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Likewise, the criticism that “government schools” are ineffective because of their
inherently bureaucratic nature is inconsistent with the democratic process itself. 161
This is precisely because bureaucracy is inherent in the democratic process, and any
large organization. Therefore, privatization as a method of eliminating bureaucracy
is an implicit attack on the democratic process.162 This is not to say that the more
schools become knotted by bureaucracy, the better they are enacting their
constitutional purpose. It is only meant to further illustrate the fundamental contrasts
between the privatization ideology at the heart of the school choice movement and
the democratic emphasis of the Common School movement out of which the Ohio
Constitution’s approach to education arose.
VI. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OHIO CHARTER SCHOOLS
This history and an informed reading of the text of the Ohio Constitution make it
clear that the ideology of privatization is incompatible with the Ohio Constitution.
The question then is whether and to what extent Ohio community school laws
demonstrate privatization characteristics.163 In attempting to answer this question,
this section will discuss the plaintiffs’ claims in the Ohio Parents & Teachers case, a
current Ohio state case challenging the validity of Ohio community schools under
the Ohio Constitution.164

“What Rendition of Democracy for America?”). The common school ideal is vulnerable to
criticism “for promoting uniformity at the cost of individuality . . . .” O’Brien & Woodrum,
supra note 12, at 641. There is an argument that the idea of teaching a certain set of values is
inconsistent with the modern understanding of values as less universal and relative to culture,
faith, etc. Id. Without entering too far into this particular debate however, it seems plausible
to argue that the political form of democracy has certain civic values embedded within it that
define the core values of the constitutional common school in every era. Id.
161

SMITH, supra note 10, at 9.

162

Id.

163

Although there are numerous books and articles about charter schools, there is
surprisingly little unbiased or legal commentary regarding the character of Ohio charter
schools. This is probably because Ohio’s charter school legislation is relatively recent (1997).
For example, Bruce Fuller’s book Inside Charter Schools, includes an extensive index with no
entry for Ohio. FULLER, supra note 99. A very recent and thorough source of information on
Ohio’s charter schools is a study by the Progressive Policy Institute. Russo, supra note 79.
Other valuable sources of information on Ohio Charter schools include the publications of the
Ohio Department of Education, Office of Community Schools available at
http://www.ode.state.oh.us/community_schools (last visited Aug. 31, 2005), the Ohio
Legislative Office of Education Oversight, available at http://www.loeo.state.oh.us (last
visited Aug. 31, 2005), and websites of interest groups such as the Center for Education
Reform (CER), available at http://www.edreform.com (last visited Aug. 31, 2005).
164

State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009.
There are other cases challenging Ohio’s charter schools as well, including federal court cases.
Russo, supra note 79, at 23. This particular case, however, has a published appellate opinion
and represents charter school opponents’ state constitutional arguments well. Id.
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A. Ohio Parents and Teacher’s Case: Summary
of the 10th Appellate District Decision165
The plaintiffs/appellants in this case are coalitions advocating on behalf of public
schools, school districts, and teachers’ unions. The Ohio Board of Education, along
with various community schools, are the defendants/appellees, while White Hat
Management, LLC, a “limited liability corporation that controls various community
schools,” is an intervening defendant/appellee.166 There are six claims at issue. First,
the plaintiffs claim that community schools are not part of the state system of
Common Schools mandated by the “thorough and efficient” clause of the
constitution because they are not owned by the public or managed by elected
officials.167 Second, the plaintiffs claim that community schools are allowed to
operate with diminished standards in violation of the same clause.168 Third, plaintiffs
allege that the method that the state uses to fund community schools diverts funds
from local school districts and thereby deprives them of the ability to satisfy the
“thorough and efficient” clause.169 Fourth, the plaintiffs allege that “community
schools violate Section 3, Article VI, Ohio Constitution, in that community schools
are not subject to local voter control” and “unconstitutionally create a shadow system
of privately owned and managed schools that circumvent local control through
locally elected school boards.”170 Fifth, the plaintiffs contend that community
schools unconstitutionally take locally voted and levied property tax revenues
without distinctly saying so.171 Lastly, the plaintiffs claim that “community schools
are not bona fide not-for-profit corporations, but, instead, are dominated by private
interests and, therefore, improperly tap into public funds.”172
165

The procedural posture of the case is as follows: The plaintiffs filed their third
amended complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in April of 2002. State ex
rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at *2. In May of
2003, that court dismissed claims four through seven, which challenge the constitutionality of
Ohio community schools. Id. The defendants then filed an appeal in the Tenth Appellate
District of the Ohio Court of Appeals. The trial court chose to address the constitutional
claims first, and therefore only claims four through seven are relevant to the appeal. Id. at *4.
After determining that the trial court’s decision is a final appealable order (given that they did
not yet address other claims in the complaint), the appellate court addressed the merits of the
defendants’ claims. Id. at *5. The court applied the de novo standard of review because of the
grant of summary judgment at the trial level. Id. at *10.
166

Id. at *1-2. See supra notes 128-29 for more discussion of White Hat Management and
its founder’s (David Brennan) connection to privatization and education in Ohio.
167
State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at
*11-12.
168

Id. at *13.

169

Id.

170

Id. at *20.

171

Id. at *22 (relating to “Section 5, Article XII, Ohio Constitution, which provides: . . .
every law imposing a tax shall state, distinctly, the object of the same, to which only, it shall
be applied”).
172
Id. at *24-25. This particular claim relates to borrowing provisions in the community
school laws and to
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In its opinion, the Tenth District Courts of Appeals first concluded that, because
the legislature specifically stated that community schools were part of the state’s
system of public education, they were Common Schools within the language of the
Ohio Constitution.173 Then, the court rejected the lower court’s finding that the
DeRolph case barred re-litigation of the plaintiffs claims related to diminished
standards and diversion of funds.174 The court affirmed dismissal of the claims
related to local control by elected school boards, reasoning that the Constitution
gives the General Assembly broad authority to provide for a thorough and efficient
system of common schools, and that modifying school districts is within that
power.175 As to the diversion of funds and disclosure to voters of the purpose of a
local tax, the court concluded that the claim raises issues of fact and reversed the
lower court dismissal.176 Lastly, the court sent the final issue—private gain from
public funds—back to the trial court as well, reasoning that it could be better
addressed by the trial court.177 Thus, the appellate court did little to resolve the
substantive issues and remanded the matter to the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas. The Ohio Supreme Court granted certiorari on February 16, 2005,
and the Court will likely hear oral arguments at the end of 2005.
B. Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims
The claims in Ohio Parents & Teachers now before the Ohio Supreme Court can
be summarized as follows: community schools violate the Ohio Constitution by de
facto operating outside the state system of public education, diverting state funds
from local school districts, and funneling public funds meant to provide a public
benefit to private beneficiaries. Each of these claims is legitimate under the theory
that privatization is unconstitutional.
1. Operating Outside the State System of Public Education
Ohio charter school laws, like those of other states, are designed to permit
innovation by removing many state regulations applicable to traditional public
schools.178 This is consistent with the original purpose of charter schools, which was

Section 4, Article VIII, Ohio Constitution, which provides: The credit of the state
shall not in any manner, be given or loaned to, or in aid of, and individual association
or corporation whatever; nor shall the state ever hereafter become a joint owner, or
stockholder, in any company or association in this state, or elsewhere, formed for any
purpose whatever.
State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at **2425.
173

Id. at *12-13.

174

Id. at *13-19.

175

Id. at *21.

176

Id. at *23.

177

Id. at **25.

178

Legislative Office of Education Oversight (LOEO), Community Schools in Ohio: Final
Report on Student Performance, Parent Satisfaction, and Accountability, (Dec. 2003),
available
at
http://www.loeo.state.oh.us/reports/PreEleSecPDF/CS_Final_Web.pdf
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that they would serve as laboratories for educational reform and experimentation
within the public school model.179 In fact, Ohio charter school legislation exempts
community schools from over one hundred state regulations: from the requirement to
pay full-time employees while on jury duty, to the required twenty-five-to-one
student-teacher ratio, to supervision by a local school board, to less stringent teacher
certification requirements.180 This plethora of exemptions is one of the main reasons
Ohio’s charter school laws are considered “strong” by national charter school
advocates.181
However, as the court noted in Ohio Parents & Teachers, the exemptions do not
necessarily place community schools outside the boundaries of the state system of
public education. The Ohio Constitution clearly gives the legislature the authority to
create a system of Common Schools in the state and does not specify how that
should be accomplished.182 On the other hand, as one commentator put it, saying a
charter school is a public school doesn’t necessarily make it so—it must function as
a public school.183
a. Exemptions Placing Charter Schools Outside the Common School System
Certain types of exemptions lead to results that substantially privatize community
schools. Because privatization characteristics are incompatible with the Ohio
Constitution, these exemptions are unconstitutional in that they cause charter schools
not to function as a public school.
i. Exemption from the Democratic Purpose of Education
Section 3313.602(B) and (C) of the Ohio Revised Code exempt community
schools from the requirement “that the ‘principles of democracy and ethics’ are

[hereinafter LOEO Final Report] (noting that community schools trade freedom from
regulations for accountability).
179

O’Brien, supra note 51, at 139-40.

180

See LOEO Final Report, supra note 177, at A1-A13 (listing thirteen pages of over onehundred Ohio Revised Code sections from which community schools are exempt). Some
other examples of exemptions include: §§ 3301.07 (State Board of Education minimum
standards on teacher training etc.); 3313.01-.18 (School Boards); 3313.202 (provision of
health insurance to employees); 3313.602(A) (policy on reciting the pledge of allegiance);
3313.609 (retaining certain chronic truants); 3313.811 (prohibiting the sale of anything for
profit unless all profits are used for school purposes or activities); 3313.97 (intradistrict open
enrollment, except for the requirement of notice within the community); 3317.022(c)(5)
(special education funds must be spent on special education students). Id. See also Scott
Stephens, Charters Use Teachers Not Fully Certified, Traditional Schools Held to Higher
Standards When Picking Instructors, THE P LAIN DEALER, Feb. 24, 2005, at A1 (noting that
fifty-five percent of teachers in Ohio charter schools are fully state-certified compared to
ninety-eight percent of teachers in traditional Ohio public schools).
181

See CER, supra note 163.

182

State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009 at
*12-13.
183

Robert J. Martin, Charting the Court Challenges to Charter Schools 109 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 43, 50 (2004).
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emphasized and discussed in appropriate parts of the curriculum” and that the
schools encourage employees to be aware of their role in instilling democratic
values.184 This explicitly undermines the democratic focus of the Constitutional
Common School. Proponents of charter schools might argue that they are not
designed to undermine anything, but only to deregulate charter schools in order to
promote innovation. It would have been easy, however, not to exempt charter
schools from this requirement. This exemption is a repudiation of the framer’s
democratic purpose for public education. Furthermore, it epitomizes the distinction
between the private benefits view of education put forward by privatization
advocates and the public benefit view that underpins the Constitutional Common
School.185
Exemption from the democratic purpose of public education is no small matter.
In addition to the Ohio Constitution’s requirement that public schools educate for
citizenship as well as knowledge, the United States Supreme Court has cited the
democratic purpose of public schools as a justification for limiting a right as
fundamental as free speech. For example, in Bethel School District v. Fraser the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not prohibit a school from
disciplining a student for lewd speech because such speech undermined the schools’
educational mission.186 In his majority opinion, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that
“[t]he process of educating our youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined
to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the
shared values of a civilized social order.”187 The Chief Justice also noted that:
[Public] education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic. . . .
It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of
self-government in the community and the nation. . . . In [Ambach v.
Norwick] we echoed the essence of this statement of the objectives of

184

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3313.602(B)-(C) (LexisNexis 2004). These sections provide as
follows:
(B) In the development of its graded course of study, the board of education of each
city and exempted village school district and the governing board of each educational
service center shall ensure that the principles of democracy and ethics are emphasized
and discussed wherever appropriate in all parts of the curriculum for grades
kindergarten through twelve.
(C) Each city, local, exempted village, and joint vocational school board shall adopt
policies that encourage all certificated and noncertificated employees to be cognizant
of their roles in instilling ethical principles and democratic ideals in all district pupils.
Id. City, village and vocational schools are specifically mentioned in these subsections while
community schools are not. In other portions of the code, e.g., subsection (D) of § 3313.602,
community schools are specifically mentioned. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.602(D)
(LexisNexis 2004). See also LOEO Final Report, supra note 178, at A-5.
185

See supra § V, B entitled “Public vs. Private Benefits”.

186

Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).

187

Id. at 683.
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public education as the [inculcation of] fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political system.188
This and other similar cases underscore the historical and contemporary
understanding of the importance of a democratic purpose for public schools.189 It is a
fundamental concept that should not be jettisoned by Ohio charter school laws.
ii. Exemption from Control by the School Board
Another exemption—exempting community schools from control by local school
boards and vesting that control in the State Board of Education—seems legitimately
within the public realm.190 The State Board of Education is still a public governing
body. However, as of July 1, 2005, the Ohio Department of Education is no longer
responsible for primary oversight of charter schools. Instead, that responsibility has
been delegated to various “sponsors” including a church, a cultural group, and a
housing development contractor.191 These private groups essentially control who
receives the millions of dollars of state money going to charter schools.
With this in mind, the reality is that control of many community schools, perhaps
the majority, ends up in the hands of private EMOs.192 Coupled with the observation
188
Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
228 (1968) and Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)) (citations and quotations
omitted).
189

Id.; see also Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).

190

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.02(C) (LexisNexis 2004). This section of the community
school laws requires a charter school to have a sponsor. Prior to 2005, most community
schools were sponsored by the State Board of Education. See LOEO Final Report, supra note
178. However, after July 1, 2005, tax-exempt, education-oriented entities meeting certain
requirements will be able to act as community school sponsors. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3314.02(C)(1)(f) (LexisNexis 2004). In practice, community schools have always been able
to contract with an EMO after receiving their charter through a tax-exempt sponsor; however,
this change will make the form even less of an obstacle to the substance. See also WELLS &
SCOTT, supra note 97, at 246; Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note
4 (noting that only non-profits can start a charter school but that they often work hand in hand
with EMOs such that it is hard to distinguish one from the other).
191

Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Charter School Oversight Shifts—Regulation by
Private Entities Sparks Fears of Conflict of Interest, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Jul. 23, 2005,
at A1. A sponsor is responsible for approving charter school contracts and for the
accountability of the charter school. The following groups are among the entities that may
sponsor charter schools: any local public school district, Ashe Cultural Center (an AfricanAmerican cultural group), Auglaize County Educational Service Center, Buckeye Community
Hope Foundation (a developer of federal housing projects), Ohio Council of Community
Schools (headed by Allison Perz), St. Aloysius Orphanage, and Educational Resource
Consultants of Ohio (affiliated with Christ Tabernacle Ministries of Excellence). Doug
Ooinger & Dennis J. Willard, School Sponsors, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Jul. 23, 2005, at
A4. See also Charter School Conflict Suggested, THE CINCINNATI POST, Jul. 25, 2005, at A6
(noting that “[m]any sponsors . . . can conduct much of their work in private because they are
not subject to Ohio’s open meetings and open records laws”).
192

Over seventy percent of state funding and charter school enrollment goes to EMOs, and,
of the EMOs over half are for-profit entities. The Ohio Coalition for Equity and Adequacy,
Community Schools in Ohio: Overview to Ohio Community Schools Spreadsheets (Sept. 17,
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that oversight of community schools has been chronically lacking since their
inception, schools operated by EMOs are functionally outside the state system of
common schools.193 When an EMO exercises total control over a school, the
motivation to educate is dominated by private, market-based concerns as opposed to
public, citizenship concerns. The end, profit, is almost certain to influence the
means. 194 This will not be an accident or a possible side effect, but instead the
intended essence of the for-profit charter school.
b. Profit-Motive Undermines the Fundamental Purposes
of the Constitutional Common School System
One commentator asserts that there are two ways to make money operating
schools: cut wages and/or cut services.195 The approach of Ohio’s largest EMO,
White Hat Management, seems to bear out this hypothesis. White Hat teachers are
unusually relatively inexperienced. In 2003-2004 the average White Hat teacher had
2.2 years of experience and a salary of $29,000 while the average public school
teachers had 14 years of experience and a salary of $46,700.196 In addition, some
White Hat schools have large student-teacher ratios; one school reported a ratio of

2004), http://www.ohiocoalition.org/pdfs/Funding_for_Charter_Schools.pdf, at 5 [hereinafter
Community Schools Overview]. These numbers are up over twenty percent since from 1999.
Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4. Nationally, ten to twelve
percent of charter schools are operated by EMOs. Walk, supra note 91, at 241. Therefore,
Ohio, in which sixty-six percent of charter schools are operated by EMOs, is well above the
national average. Russo, supra note 80, at 5. In fact, in its overview of privatization in public
education, Education Week magazine calls EMOs the “second wave” in the charter
movement. Education Week Research Center: Privatization of Public Education (2005),
available at http://www.edweek.org/rc/issues/privatization-of-public-education (last visited
Aug. 31, 2005).
193

See Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4 (detailing the
state’s gross disregard for its oversight responsibilities during the first few years of Ohio
community schools); Community Schools Overview, supra note 192, at 10 (describing the
lack of accountability to which community schools have been held as of 2004); Russo, supra
note 79, at 31 (describing the serious lack of accountability data available on community
schools and including increased accountability and oversight in concluding policy
recommendations).
194

WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 247-48. But see Walk, supra note 92, at 243.

195

MINER, supra note 86, at 138.

196

Jennifer Mrozowski, These Schools Sell Education for Profit, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER,
Jun. 30, 2005, at 1A (quoting national charter school researcher Gary Miron concerning forprofit charter schools: “In large part, a lot of money is siphoned off for management fees. It
doesn’t get to instruction.”); Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Parents Have Freedom of
Choice, But Not Freedom of Information, THE AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 12, 1999, at
A1. This difference in salary and experience is not specific to White Hat schools, but true of
charter schools in general. Scott Stephens, Teachers Leaving Charter Schools, THE PLAIN
DEALER, Jul. 1, 2005, at B1 (citing an study conducted by a Ohio State University research
group established by the Ohio Board of Regents). One reason that teachers at charter schools
are relatively inexperienced is that half of them leave each year. Jennifer Mrozowski,
Charters Have High Turnover, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jul. 3, 2005, at 1C.
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ninety-three to one.197 Moreover, White Hat has cut costs by not offering services
like gifted programs and instead has done just the opposite by offering a high school
diploma for computer-based tutoring for three hours per day designed to achieve
ninth grade proficiency.198
Furthermore the numerous cyberschools, many of them operated by for-profit
EMOs, that have opened in the past several years demonstrate how far deregulation
has allowed community schools to stray from the Constitutional Common School
goals of democratic citizenship. In common language, “community cyberschool”
would be an oxymoron. Instead of bringing all the diversity of the community
together in a common learning environment, cyberschools by their nature isolate
individuals from the community.199
Similarly, charter schools can interfere with the democratic purpose of education
in more subtle ways such as de facto pupil selectivity. That is, certain societal
groups (defined by wealth, religion, etc.) are strategically excluded or included
because of the design of the specific charter school. Studies of charter schools in
California and Michigan concluded that charter school laws can allow for and even
compel schools to become more private and expand financial and other
inequalities.200 Some ways in which charter schools may purposely or inadvertently
exclude certain students or families include: targeted recruitment of certain types of
students (especially via first-come-first-serve enrollment), mandatory parent
meetings/involvement, and geographic distribution of charter schools.201 This is
privatization to the extent that certain children, often of poor, undereducated, or
unconcerned parents, are sorted out. The Ohio law, O.R.C.§ 3313.97, exempting
charter schools from open school district enrollment might have this effect.202
Although charter schools are not exempt from notifying families within the
immediate vicinity of the charter school under this law, during the first several years
no charter school designed to serve the generalized public needs of a neighborhood
community had opened in Ohio.203
On the other hand, no available study of Ohio charter schools has found the kind
of targeted recruitment strategies discussed in the California study.204 The most
197
Community Schools Overview, supra note 192, at 9; Stephens, Teachers Leaving
Charter Schools, supra note 195 (noting that the average student-teacher ratio in Ohio charter
schools is 30-1 compared to 19-1 in traditional public schools).
198
Id.; See also Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4 (also
noting that, although EMOs were making profits, there was no evidence that they were
reducing costs).
199

See generally ENGEL, supra note 88, at 86. See also Welsh-Huggins, supra note 132
(noting that student/teacher interaction has been an issue in Ohio cyberschools and that Ohio
state legislators will “look at online academies to ensure that pupils interact with teachers”).
200

WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 234-35; Oplinger & Willard, Parents Have Freedom
of Choice, But Not Freedom of Information, supra note 196.
201

WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 250-53 (calling charter school’s ability to control
who enrolls as “refining the art of excluding the unwelcome”).
202

OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 3313.97 (LexisNexis 2004).

203

Oplinger & Willard, Charter Experiment Goes Awry, supra note 4.

204

WELLS & SCOTT, supra note 97, at 234-35.
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recent data indicates that “Ohio’s charter schools serve higher percentages of poor
and minority students than traditional public schools in the state.”205 Nonetheless, it
is likely that the scope of deregulation enacted by Ohio’s “strong” charter school
laws has had a social privatization effect. As one researcher stated it, “[t]he potential
is there for various kinds of sorting and selection . . . . [t]hat we regard as a
dysfunctional development.”206 In fact, the social privatization effect of Ohio charter
schools may be to further isolate underprivileged children. The fact that charter
schools serve a higher percentage of poor children simply indicates increased
segregation of the poor from the affluent, thereby subverting the integration goal of
the Constitutional Common School.
Another aspect of deregulation that the plaintiffs’ claims address is the creation
of a competing “shadow system” of charter schools operating with diminished
academic standards.207 The “thorough and efficient” clause contemplates one system
of state-funded public education. Prior to the Constitutional Convention of 1850-51
Ohio schools were fragmented, with state money going to various disconnected
sectarian schools.208 The convention delegates regarded this competition among
schools as “the greatest impediment to the advancement of education.”209 They
purposely chose to avoid creating competing factions by requiring a system of
Common Schools.210 However, the current rules, particularly § 3314.02, purposely
create charter schools to compete with struggling traditional public schools in hopes
of fostering improvement via competitive market forces.211 Ironically, charter
schools are then given a competitive advantage in that they are exempt from many of
the state mandates that increase costs and dictate the degree and manner of services
provided.212 It seems patently unfair to assert that the neutrality of a competitive

205

Russo, supra note 79, at 14.

206

Oplinger & Willard, Parents Have Freedom of Choice, But Not Freedom of
Information, supra note 195.
207

State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at
*20; Scott Stephens, Charter Schools Get a Break: Rules Let Low Scores Draw a Passing
Grade, THE PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 9, 2004, at B1.
208

O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 640.

209

Id.

210

Id.

211

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.02 (LexisNexis 2004). This section allows for the
creation of new charter schools in urban and “challenged” school districts. Thus, school
districts that are already struggling in “academic watch” or “academic emergency” are subject
to competition from a charter school. Id. The idea behind this is to give parents a way out of
struggling traditional public schools, but also to provide market-based incentives for
improvement.
212

For example, §§ 3317.022(C)(5), .023 of the Ohio Revised Code exempt community
schools from provision of educational services requirements such as the student teacher ratio,
the manner in which special education funds are spent, and special education staffing. See
also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.202 (LexisNexis 2004) (exempting community schools
from “requirements related to the provision of life, health, accident, and legal insurance
benefits for school district employees”); LOEO Final Report, supra note 177, at A-3. These
are significant costs that community schools are able to manage in ways that traditional public
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market will promote improvement and then create a system in which charter schools
have a significant market advantage due to statutory exemptions. The plaintiffs’
claims that deregulation creates a shadow system seem valid in light of the fact that
charter schools and traditional schools are operating under significantly different
standards; the absence of a level playing field suggests that there are really two
playing fields.
c. Competition is a Pretext for Privatization of the Public School System, not a
Stimulant to the Constitutional Common School System
This unfairness indicates that competition within the public system is really a
pretext for privatization of the system. In fact, there is significant evidence that
many of the key players involved in creating Ohio’s educational policy are adamant
advocates of privatization, and that a considerable amount of lobbying and
promotion has been designed to undermine the public’s faith in the public school
system.213 For example, Governor Taft appointed Deborah Owens Fink to fill a
vacant spot on the Ohio Board of Education. Ms. Fink was formerly a contributor to
the Buckeye Institute, a conservative Ohio think tank championing the “elimina[tion
of] most of government and allowing free enterprise to solve society’s problems.”214

schools cannot. In addition, the cyberschool saga indicates that charter school exemptions
have allowed certain families or students to avoid mandatory proficiency testing. That is, a
significant number of students enrolled in cyberschools are not taking state-mandated
proficiency tests, and online school enrollment declines at the beginning of March, when
proficiency tests are administered. Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Online Students
Missing Exams, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, June 3, 2005, at A1. Even more ironically, the
most recent studies do not indicate that charter schools are more successful, despite their
competitive advantage. Ohio Department of Education 2004-2005 District Report Cards,
available at http://www.ode.state.oh.us/reportcard/archives/Default.asp; Scott Stephens &
Reginald Fields, Ohio Charter Schools Struggling, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 18, 2005, at B1.
213

For example, when Governor Taft was asked whether there is statistical evidence that
school choice improves academic performance, Taft dodged the question and responded: “I
have lost my patience with children trapped in failing schools.” Dennis J. Willard & Doug
Oplinger, Private School Funds to Go Up, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Feb. 20, 2005, at A1.
See also Oplinger & Willard, School Battle Eludes Voters, supra note 75 (describing the
players in the political battle over educational policy in Ohio); Warsmith & Byard, supra note
138. Warsmith & Byard note that school choice advocates are winning the battle of public
perception, i.e., convincing the public that traditional public schools are miserable failures.
“Urban school leaders said what they are battling is often “perceptions” rather than the reality
of what’s happening in their schools. [One administrator] said parents have told her the
district needs to get computers – when they already have them in every classroom.” Id.
214

Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75. The Buckeye Institute “supports dramatic reduction
in the role of government,” receives contributions from EMO owner David Brennan, and
publishes research supporting Brennan’s privatized schools. Id. The Institute’s research,
however, has employed fuzzy math and been discredited in the past. Id. Furthermore, the
Ohio Teacher’s Union recently accused David Brennan of trading campaign donations for
favorable treatment of Brennan’s for-profit charter schools. See e.g., Jennifer Mrozowski,
Charter School Owner Accused, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 17, 2005, at 1B. As a result,
Brennan was asked to explain to Ohio’s legislative inspector general why he should not be
considered a lobbyist. Dennis J. Willard & Doug Oplinger, Brennan Faces Inquiry into
Influence—Charter School Advocate to be Asked Why His Private Talks with Legislators
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The Buckeye Institute has been active in the privatization movement in Ohio,
although in a clandestine manner because the Institute believes that “school choice”
would fail if submitted directly to the voters. Instead, the Institute believes it can
control educational policy in the state by controlling the Ohio General Assembly.215
Educational lobbyists Clint Satow and David Zanotti have also spoken out
against public schools using the language of privatization. Satow has said that
“community schools will eventually break [the] monopoly on public education . . .
.”216 Zanotti, who has significant personal and professional ties to former Governor
Voinovich and David Brennan, is the head of the School Choice Committee and
certain right-wing religious groups advocating for school choice in order to create
schools in line with a more conservative Christian ideology.217
Finally, although it would seem that charter school proponents would want more
funding to go toward public schools (because charter schools are supposedly public
schools themselves, funded by tax dollars), Ohio charter school consultant Allison
Perz encouraged charter school operators to vote against a ballot issue approving the
sale of bonds to repair Ohio’s public school buildings because the issue does not
directly benefit charter schools.218 The initiator of Ohio charter school legislation,
former state legislator and current White Hat lobbyist Sally Perz (Allison Perz’s
mother), expresses the privatization ideology underlying her approach by saying that
charter schools should never have been under the auspices of the State Board of
Education. She said, “[i]t was a bad fit from the get go, having this entrepreneurial
type of school housed in a big state bureaucracy.”219 Sally Perz also advocates for
school choice for parents “no matter what,” indicating that, for her, charter schools
are not about innovation within the Common School framework but about
privatization generally.220
This political atmosphere indicates that charter schools in Ohio are about the
market ideology of privatization, and elevating factions–such as explicitly religious
public schools–above the Common School ideology of an integrated democratic
society. Ohio has come to embody the suggestion of one educational privatization
study, which states that: “It is possible that some less-than-optimal charters have
been ratified by expansive state laws in order to create a critical mass of charter
schools that will rapidly inject market forces into public education.”221 This
approach underscores the view that charter schools in Ohio are “a great idea for

Don’t Make Him a Lobbyist Under Law, July 10, 2005, at A1; but see Dennis J. Willard, State
Rules Brennan No Lobbyist, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Aug. 5, 2005, at A1.
215

Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75.

216

Id.

217

Id; see also Doug Oplinger & Dennis J. Willard, Campaign Organizer Pushes Hard for
Changes: David Zanotti Exercises Influence Over Officials While Leading the Attack on
Public School System, AKRON BEACON JOURNAL, Dec. 15, 1999, at A7.
218

Oplinger & Willard, supra note 75.

219

Russo, supra note 79, at 8.

220

Id. at 9.

221

KANE & LAURICELLA, supra note 80, at 212.
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smaller more autonomous schools that has been hijacked by people whose idea is to
privatize public education.”222
2. Diverting Funds from Local School Districts and
Putting Public Dollars in Private Pockets
The claims in State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers that Ohio’s
method of funding community schools channels state dollars away from local school
districts and into private hands also implicates the prevalence of EMOs in the state.
Essentially, the plaintiffs claim that the state actually gives locally raised tax dollars
to charter schools without local voter approval.223 This claim is based on the fact that
the state gives each school district a set per-pupil “foundation” amount multiplied by
the number of pupils in the district.224 That number is then reduced by the amount of
locally raised tax dollars up to a certain ceiling.225 This is known as a “charge-off.”
However, for each pupil in a community school within a school district, the state
deducts from that local district’s funds the full foundation amount prior to the local
tax charge-off per student.226 Thus, local school districts can claim that either (1)
local funds are supporting charter schools without local control of those schools; or,
(2) the state is providing less funds because of the presence of charter schools in the
district.227 If those funds are going to legitimately public schools within the state
system of Common Schools, it may not matter that the school district is losing funds
because the legislature has simply decided to reallocate the way it provides for a
222

Russo, supra note 79, at 29.

223

State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at

*22.
224
FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis, supra note 76, at 112. The state uses a
foundation formula to calculate state aid to public school districts. Quality Counts 2005: No
Small Change: Targeting Money Toward Student Performance, EDUCATION WEEK, Jan. 6,
2005, Vol. 24, Issue 17, at 70. “Foundation formulas” use a multi-step process to determine
the amount necessary to provide school districts with a base level of funding necessary to
provide an adequate education. Id. For the 2004-2005 school year, the foundation level in
Ohio is $5,169. FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis, supra note 76, at 111-12. In
order to calculate the total amount of cost for a district, the $5,169 is multiplied by the number
of students in the district and the cost of doing business in the district. Id.
225

FY 2004 – FY 2005 Operating Budget Analysis, supra note 76, at 111-12.

226

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314.08 (LexisNexis 2004).

227
For example: Assume that the state gives funds in the amount of $100 per student and
there are ten students in District A. District A is thus entitled to $1000 of state aid before the
local tax charge-off. Assume that District A raises $600 in local property tax revenue. The
state then will subtract that $600 from the $1000 total, and give District A $400. However, if
one of District A’s students transfers to a community school within the district, the state will
give $100 to the community school and deduct $100 from the amount they give to the local
school district. Thus, District A now has $900 to educate nine students. But whereas before
the student transferred to the community school forty percent of the total amount ($400/1000)
came from the state, now only thirty-three percent ($300/900) comes from the state. It is
difficult to deny that the local school district has suffered a loss here, whether one
characterizes it as local funds going to charter schools or a reduction in state aid due to charter
schools. Phillis, supra note 115.
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system of Common Schools.228 However, the privatization aspects of charter schools
discussed above, particularly in for-profit charter schools, seriously challenge the
characterization of charter schools as public within the Constitutional Common
School model.
Not only are the democratic citizenship goals of Constitutional Common Schools
fundamentally undermined by EMOs’ profit motive, but some of the tax dollars from
the state education budget are not being spent on schools at all–they are used to
enrich private entities. If these EMOs were providing the same service as public
schools–a free and adequate education for everyone and anyone in the district–this
would be economically harmless privatization. Just as a public school district that
pays a private independent electrician to update the schools’ wiring considers the
electrician’s profit part of the legitimate cost of procuring the service, the EMOs’
profit would be a legitimate cost of the EMO taking on the state’s responsibility for
providing a system of Common Schools. However, the charter school EMOs are not
providing an education consistent with the Constitutional Common School. The
most recent Ohio academic achievement data shows that charter schools are doing no
better, and in some cases worse, than comparable traditional public schools.229
EMOs are finding ways to spend less on education–a worthy goal if possible–but
without the innovation and statewide improvement via competition promised by
market theory privatization adherents.230 For example, cyberschools, which provide
few of the democratic goals of public schools, are a goldmine for private EMOs. 231
A computer costs less than a teacher. The flood of for-profit cyberschools in Ohio is
a result of their economic viability, not their educational quality within the Common
School ideal. If EMOs are not improving educational outputs, then the argument that
they are simply using education as a way of moving money from government to
private pockets is even more compelling.
C. Predicted Outcome
The plaintiffs in the Ohio Parents & Teachers case are unlikely to prevail before
the Ohio Supreme Court. The general idea that privatization itself is fundamentally
inconsistent with the Ohio Constitution has only recent history as a legal theory, and
no winning precedent.232 Furthermore, the Court in DeRolph IV and Lewis indicated

228
But see Russo, supra note 79, at 23 (stating that reallocation to charter schools of public
funds for education is an issue).
229

Id.

230
See generally LOEO Final Report, supra note 178. Commentators also note that charter
schools have not led to dramatic curricular innovations. See, e.g., O’Brien, supra note 51, at
158.
231
See Stephens, Ohio Virtually Booming With Cyber Schools, supra note 5 (noting that
Akron Digital Academy, a cyberschool operated by a public school district, gave $500,000 of
state aid that would have been pure profit to a private company back to the district’s general
fund).
232
But see O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 636-42. O’Brien & Woodrum’s
thorough analysis of the development of the education clause in the Ohio Constitution of 1851
concludes that school choice is incompatible with the values of the constitutional common
school. “The constitutional framers . . . rejected the idea of competition among school
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an intention to leave the specifics of the system of Common Schools in Ohio to the
General Assembly.233 Subsequent changes in the make-up of the Ohio Supreme
Court only strengthen this position.234 Likewise, in the aftermath of DeRolph IV it is
particularly unlikely that the Court will embroil itself in the funding debate at the
heart of the plaintiffs’ diversion of funds claims. The Court has already said that the
system is over-reliant on local property taxes, and it will not enter into the details of
that issue again.
Precedent from other states also favors the defendants. Courts in Michigan,
Pennsylvania and a few other states have rejected similar claims regarding delegating
authority outside of local control and contracting out as an invalid method of
assuring a thorough and efficient state system.235 Although funding concerns remain
the most significant and unresolved legal issue for charter schools, courts tend to
avoid these issues, preferring to leave them to legislative determination.236 A recent
commentator analyzing state claims against charter schools with a view toward
national trends concluded that after a decade of state constitutional challenges to
charter school laws such challenges have not been a significant obstacle to charter
school expansion nationally.237

districts and a variety of sectarian schools, viewing competition as inefficient, divisive, and
ineffective.” Id. at 640.
233

DeRolph IV, 780 N.E.2d at 533-34 (Resnick, J., concurring); Lewis, 789 N.E.2d at 202
(stating that “because it is beyond a doubt that Judge Lewis and common pleas court patently
and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over any post-DeRolph IV proceedings, we now grant a
peremptory writ and end any further litigation in DeRolph v. State”).
234

Justice Sweeney and Justice Douglas, who were in the majority that declared the state
system unconstitutional in DeRolph I, are no longer on the Court. The dissenters, Justice
Moyer and Justice Stratton have been joined by Justice Maureen O’Connor, Justice Terrence
O’Donnell, and Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger, who are more ideologically aligned with
Moyer’s nonjusticiability principle. Sweeney and Douglas were accused of judicial activism
in their approach to the DeRolph case by supporters of O’Donnell and Lanzinger. See For
Ohio Supreme Court, TOLEDO BLADE, Oct. 21, 2004, at A10.
235
Martin, supra note 183, at 68-74 (analyzing a series of state constitutional challenges to
charter school laws). Martin first analyzes the Michigan case, Council of Orgs. and Others for
Educ. About Parochiaid v. Governor, 566 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. 1997), and notes that the
Michigan Supreme Court rejected claims that charter schools were not within state control,
inappropriately managed by un-elected entities, and channeled funds to religious schools. Id.
at 68; see also KEMERER, supra note 108, at 41-42 (discussing the same case as well as the
Pennsylvania case, School Dist. of Wilkinsburg v. Wilkinsburg Educ. Ass’n, 667 A.2d 5 (Pa.
1995)).
236
Martin, supra note 183, at 102 (noting, however, that despite the fact that state courts
have demonstrated a tendency to avoid funding issues, funding concerns remain the most
significant and unresolved legal issue for charter schools). In fact, Martin notes that in a New
Jersey case, In re Englewood, 727 A.2d 15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999), aff’d as modified
by 753 A.2d 687 (N.J. 2000), the appellate court held that the “thorough and efficient clause”
in the New Jersey constitution had not been violated by funding charter schools, but noted in
dicta that the clause might be violated if a district could show that it was harmed by having to
fund a charter school. Id. at 70-71.
237

Martin, supra note 183, at 91.
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D. Proposed Outcome
The Ohio Supreme Court should invalidate the privatization aspects of the Ohio
community school laws. Ohio’s constitution guarantees a system of public education
in the Common School tradition of “universal, free, non-sectarian education for selfgovernment, enlightenment, and economic advancement.”238 Privatizing education is
fundamentally inconsistent with the Constitutional Common School. Therefore, to
the extent that community schools privatize education they are unconstitutional.
Ohio’s community schools show privatization characteristics in that they deregulate
public schools by permitting (and perhaps encouraging via market incentives) charter
schools to abandon the notion of education for democratic self-government in favor
of a market-based private benefits approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
Constitutional “community” schools may be possible. The initial idea of a
neighborhood school that reflects the character of the community, is free and open to
the public, and uses innovative and effective pedagogy is not inconsistent with the
Constitutional Common School. It is the infusion of market theory privatization that
contradicts the Constitutional Common School ideal. Therefore, Ohio’s community
school laws should be revised to prohibit for-profit EMOs from operating
community schools. Cyberschools, which take the community right out of
community schools by their very nature, should be eliminated or at least treated
entirely independently of community schools.239 In addition, and as proposed by the
Legislative Office of Educational Oversight, supervision of charter schools should be
re-aligned with the original intention to trade autonomy for accountability. Not only
should the schools be accountable for academics, but they should also be accountable
for fostering and maintaining the Common School purpose of their community
school. Therefore, the exemptions from promoting democratic citizenship under §
3313.602(B) and (C) should be repealed.
Education in the state of Ohio is in turmoil and traditional public schools, which
often resort to the “factory model” of education, are not delivering on many of the
promises of the Constitutional Common School either.240 Community schools still
238

O’Brien & Woodrum, supra note 12, at 616.

239

The Ohio General Assembly took a step in this direction in the June, 2005 budget bill
by placing a moratorium on new cyberschools until state officials can determine more
effective standards and regulations for the online schools. Scott Stephens, Measures Put
Charter Schools on Notice: Sharper Eyes Watching for Successes or Failures, THE P LAIN
DEALER, June 26, 2005, at B1.
240
The “factory model” of education is the dominant public school model. Children have
little autonomy within a patriarchal and hierarchal school structure. Students are divided into
age groups and spend a lot of their time working individually listening to lectures or doing
worksheets. O’Brien, supra note 51, at 146-48. In their classic work on education in
America, Bowles and Gintis argue that the traditional public school model of education –the
“factory model” – does not foster the independent thinking crucial to democratic citizenship
but instead teaches children to be conformist and docile. SAMUEL BOWLES AND HERBERT
GINTIS, SCHOOLING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA 93 in EDUCATION, INC.: TURNING LEARNING INTO
A BUSINESS 131, 137 (Alfie Kohn & Patrick Shannon eds., 2002). For a more recent
discussion of the “factory model of education” idea, see O’Brien, supra note 51, at 146-56.
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have a role to play. They still represent an opportunity to improve upon a factory
model of education with a more democratically charged approach that assists all of
Ohio’s children in becoming good, productive citizens. The “small school”
movement seems to be moving in that direction.241 Community schools could find
new relevance by divorcing themselves from EMOs and exploring the possibilities of
neighborhood “small schools.”242 By focusing charter school initiatives on small,
community-created and community-focused schools sponsored by local school
districts but within the context of the state Constitutional Common School ideology,
community schools could truly become innovative public schools. Although such a
regulated approach to charter schools would allow for less freedom from state
curricular standards, it would still allow for significant improvements in the “hidden
curriculum” of the school and offer a promising alternative to the factory model of
education.243 As O’Brien writes:
The freedom to decide obvious structural issues – such as the size of the
school, the length of class periods, the length and timing of holidays, the
responsibilities of teachers and administrators, the role of students in the
classroom, and the less obvious atmosphere issues (such as whether
students may sit on the floor or wear hats indoors) – is the freedom to
change the messages that are implicit in the structure, power relationships,
and atmosphere of the school. Personal autonomy and institutional
flexibility, even within constraints placed on the charter school structure,
may provide some room within the hidden curriculum for teaching
liberty.244
With this in mind, instead of undermining the democratic citizenship goals of the
Constitutional Common School, charter schools could better promote those goals.
Unfortunately, the privatization aspects of community schools will be difficult to
eliminate so long as the state does not allocate sufficient funds per child to provide a

241
Small Schools, THE PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 31, 2004, at B4; Angela Townsend, ‘Small
Schools’ Test Area Districts, THE PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 22, 2004, at B1; Chris Sheridan,
Cutting High Schools Down to Size, THE PLAIN DEALER, July 25, 2004, at H4.
242

Russo, supra note 79, at 30-31 (recommending more support and encouragement for
small, community-created and focused charter schools as well as local district sponsorship of
charter schools). In fact, there is a recent trend toward district sponsorship of charter schools.
See, e.g., Ebony Reed, District Considers Giving Charter Schools Another Try, THE PLAIN
DEALER, Mar. 19, 2005, at B3.
243

O’Brien describes the “hidden curriculum” as
consist[ing] of the implicit messages we give to students about differential power and
social evaluation when students learn how schools actually work, what kinds of
knowledge there are, which kind of knowledge is valued, and how students are viewed
in relation to school. These are the things that are learned informally and are
sometimes, but not always, unintentional outcomes of the formal structure and
curricular content of schooling.
O’Brien, supra note 51, at 150-51 (quoting KATHLEEN P. BENNETT & MARGARET D.
LECOMPTE, THE WAY SCHOOLS WORK: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF EDUCATION 245-46
(Naomi Silverman & Judith Harlan eds., 1990)).
244

Id. at 174-75.
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constitutionally adequate public education. Until the state addresses this issue,
charter schools will compete with traditional public schools for scarce funds and
deregulation will justify claims that charter schools are thwarting the constitutional
requirement of a single system of Common Schools. The market ideology
underlying privatization welcomes competition for scarce resources. So long as
privatization is the guiding philosophy of state policymakers, it is less likely that
sufficient funding per child will be allocated.
By invalidating the privatization aspects of Ohio community school laws, the
judicial branch could help re-direct the course of the charter school movement in
Ohio. Unlike the level of state funding necessary to adequately educate a child in
Ohio, this is a justiciable issue. 245 Chapter 3314 of the Ohio Revised Code sets forth
the laws related to community schools.246 These laws may be constitutional or not.
If the court decides that privatization is unconstitutional, it can then invalidate
community school laws that show sufficient privatization characteristics. Then it
will once again be up to the General Assembly to legislate toward a constitutional
community school.
NATHANIEL J. MCDONALD

245

State ex rel. Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 4009, at

*18.
246

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3314 (LexisNexis 2004).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss3/7

46

